发布时间:2025-07-24 作者: 王文 费里西亚诺·吉马良斯
继2024年9月10日首届中拉人权圆桌会在巴西里约热内卢成功举办之后,第二届中拉人权圆桌会将于7月25日在巴西圣保罗举办。与会前,中国人民大学重阳金融研究院院长、全球领导力学院院长王文对话巴西国际关系中心(CEBRI)学术主任兼高级研究员费里西亚诺·吉马良斯(Feliciano de Sá Guimarães),就中巴关系等一系列问题进行对话。
编者按:继2024年9月10日首届中拉人权圆桌会在巴西里约热内卢成功举办之后,第二届中拉人权圆桌会将于7月25日在巴西圣保罗举办。与会前,中国人民大学重阳金融研究院院长、全球领导力学院院长王文对话巴西国际关系中心(CEBRI)学术主任兼高级研究员费里西亚诺·吉马良斯(Feliciano de Sá Guimarães),就中巴关系等一系列问题进行对话。视频在外网引起广泛关注,现将对话视频及内容上篇发布如下(下篇将于近日发布):(全文约7000字,预计阅读时间18分钟)
以上为王文与费里西亚诺·吉马良斯对话上半部分视频,时长约26分22秒,点击观看视频
吉马良斯:很高兴来到这里,与王文教授交谈,讨论巴西和中国的双边关系,以及当前国际社会形势。巴西目前正面临非常困难的时刻,原因之一是与美国的持续关系问题。我认为我们有很多内容值得探讨。
我要问的第一个问题正是关于这一点。近期,美国对巴西加征了50%的关税;而在今年4月,中国也曾面临高达140%的关税威胁,但最终中国成功地使特朗普政府作出了让步。请问王文教授,中国在应对美国施加关税的过程中获得了哪些宝贵经验?这些经验对我们来说非常重要,能否请您详细分析一下?
王文:感谢你,我的朋友,很荣幸与你展开这次对话。首先,感谢你对中国反击美国关税战所做努力的肯定。事实上,我必须先与你分享一个非常重要的“秘密”:自特朗普1.0时代以来,中国至少已经为这场关税战准备了7年。
自2018年特朗普首次对中国发动关税战,并在加拿大扣押孟晚舟、对华为实施禁运开始,中国就彻底放弃了对美国的幻想。在中国看来,美国帝国主义的本质已经充分暴露。美国不可能放弃遏制中国的战略,更不可能是一个无私、公平、公正的国家。依靠美国是无法实现国家安全的,中国必须依靠自身。
从那时起,中国加速了“去美国化”进程,特别是在科技自主、贸易自主、资源自主这三个方面。下面我将逐一与你分享三个观点。
第一,科技自主方面。中国的科技研发投入年均增长约15%,在第四次智能革命中实现了追赶。不仅体现在你可能正在使用的DeepSeek、TikTok等软件产品上,还包括无人机、机器人、芯片等硬件领域。中国逐渐实现了科技产品的国产替代,这使中国具备了对美技术贸易中的反击能力。
第二,资源自主方面。中国采取了极为精准的稀土管控战略。正如你所知,中国稀土出口占全球约90%的市场份额。没有中国的稀土,美国将无法制造许多高端武器和高科技产品,因此美国不得不与中国谈判与妥协。
第三,贸易自主方面。中国积极推动多元化的国际战略。2025年上半年,中国对美贸易总额下降了约20%,但对外贸易总额却增长了2.9%,尤其是对非洲、中亚、拉美等新兴市场的贸易增长达10%–15%,其中包括巴西。2014年,对美贸易占中国对外贸易的20%,如今已下降至10%。换句话说,美国仍然重要,但已不再像过去那样重要。
更值得注意的是,中国制造业在全球占比超过30%,在全球供应链中具有不可替代性,中国产品在世界市场上具有强大竞争力。也就是说,如你所提到,中美贸易关系与七年前相比,美国更需要中国,而不是中国更需要美国。
表面上看,中国是在应对美国的关税战,但本质上,中国是在对抗美国的霸权、摆脱对美国的依赖。中国人愿意与美国合作,但这种合作不是通过跪求获得的,而是通过斗争争取来的。中国越来越清楚,美国是不可靠的,只有依靠国家独立与自主发展,才能实现自身安全。
这就是为什么我想与你分享这些看法,我的巴西朋友。以我对巴西的了解,巴西正在做着与中国类似的努力。我曾经五次访问巴西,在圣保罗、巴西利亚、里约热内卢、贝洛奥里藏特等地认识了许多巴西朋友。巴西也正走在国家独立、国家自主的道路上,也敢于对美国发出挑战,这一点值得高度敬佩。
中国坚定支持巴西追求国家独立与经济自主,并愿意与巴西开展平等、互利的合作。我相信,巴西有智慧和能力应对美国关税的挑战。这是我的建议,也希望能与您分享一些看法。
吉马良斯:谢谢王文教授,您提出的观点非常精彩。我认为,巴西与中国的关系,与巴西和美国的关系之间,有许多相似之处。
举几个数字,在1990年代,美国占巴西出口的35%;到了2025年,这一比例降至12%。而1990年代,中国仅占1%,如今占据30%至35%之间,具体取决于统计方式。
这显示出一个明显的变化:巴西与美国的关系,已经无法与巴西与中国的关系相比。我认为,如今的中巴关系正处于多年来的最好时期。卢拉总统自上任以来,投入了大量精力,重新调整并定义了中巴双边关系。
我认为,卢拉总统与习近平主席关系良好。每次两位领导人会面,都会带来新的合作成果。中国对巴西的投资不断增加,巴西也由此获得更多进入中国市场的机会。
当然,美国仍然非常强大,地理因素也非常重要。我们身处世界的这一边,距离美国更近,约有150万巴西人生活在美国。虽然中国是巴西最大的贸易伙伴,但美国仍是巴西最大的投资国。如果看投资存量,美国和欧盟对巴西的投资依然远高于中国。当然,中国正在迅速追赶,我们可以看到中国对巴西投资的多元化趋势。
初期的中国投资主要集中在电力、电网和基础设施领域。但如今,由于卢拉总统与习近平主席的关系,可以看到越来越多的中国公司来到巴西。例如,前几天巴西媒体报道圣保罗一条大道已经被称为“小中国街”,因为那里聚集了大量中国公司,新开的中餐馆、办公室等。
这仅仅是一个城市。在习近平主席去年11月访问里约热内卢期间,中国宣布了多项新投资。其中最具象征意义的是比亚迪在巴伊亚州的新工厂。福特公司退出后,比亚迪接手了整个工厂。这象征着中国企业在某种程度上取代了美国企业在巴西的地位。有专家预计,比亚迪未来几年将占据巴西汽车市场的10%。
我自己也在期待人生中的第一辆比亚迪车。这反映出中巴关系正在发生实质性转变。但这并不意味着美国和特朗普在巴西没有影响。事实上,巴西国内有一个强大的政治派系仍然支持与美国的双边关系。在博索纳罗政府时期,中巴关系变得异常复杂。
然而,后来巴西国内逐渐意识到,无论谁担任总统,无论来自左翼还是右翼,与中国的经济关系都更为重要。
尽管博索纳罗试图阻断中巴关系,但那些出口大宗商品并支持博索纳罗的农民,却在国会中反对他。他们强烈要求更换当时反华的外交部长,换上一位对华更友善的官员。这说明中巴之间的经济关系,甚至政治关系,已经上升到与美巴关系同等重要的地位。
今天,世界上能对巴西内政产生实质性影响的国家,除了美国,也包括中国。正因中美是全球最大的两个经济体,对巴西社会有着重要影响力。
但是,现在我们面临特朗普带来的问题。自从第二轮关税开始以来,我每天都在接受媒体采访。巴西是除中国外,特朗普加征关税最多的国家——高达50%。而其他大多数国家只加征了20%–30%。
造成这20%差异的原因有两个:
第一,美国大型科技公司(如Meta、Facebook、Google等)不愿在巴西缴税,不希望受到监管。巴西国会和最高法院正在讨论如何对它们进行规范。
第二,特朗普希望推翻现任卢拉政府,使其在2026年大选中失败,由更亲美、反华的右翼总统取而代之。这基本上是一场由美国主导的“政权更迭”行动。
美国已经开始用关税作为手段,而这很可能只是一个长期危机的开始。制裁、干预与影响将持续到2026年大选。
因此,中国在应对美方关税谈判中的经验对我们巴西来说非常重要。我们也必须制定应对战略。现在巴西政府内部已开始激烈讨论相关策略。
我们可能无法“反击”美国,但我们必须“遏制”负面影响,减少这场持续危机和美国可能施加的额外压力与制裁工具的破坏性。
最后,我再举一个例子:今天美国仍有能力在军事领域对巴西实施制裁。巴西武器系统大多来自欧洲或美国,如果中美关系恶化,美国可以通过断供零件制裁我们。比如空军直升机、战斗机,甚至潜艇零部件。所以我们在这种情况下非常脆弱,必须非常谨慎地处理与美国的谈判关系。
如果我们现在开始购买中国的武器系统,那将非常有意义。到目前为止,巴西军队中还没有任何中国制造的武器系统。部分军方人士对中国军备仍存疑虑。但印度与巴基斯坦的冲突已经证明,中国的武器系统具有实战能力,展示了中国军事技术的先进性,与西方国家不相上下。
因此,巴西必须实现军备多元化。正如你所说,中国曾经有20%的贸易依赖美国,而今天仅为10%。尽管失去了这部分份额,中国却通过扩大其他国家的贸易,实现了整体增长2.9%。这正是巴西也应当学习的战略路径。
王文:我认为你刚才提到了一个非常重要的观点。在当下,我们确实需要重新思考美国霸权。我不确定是否真的应该“颠覆性思考”,但回到我们这次讨论的核心问题,我们诚挚邀请您参加我们即将举行的中拉人权圆桌会议,这是关于中国和拉丁美洲之间的人权问题的会议。
刚才您提到的一些观点,我非常赞同。所有国家——特别是中国、巴西这样的新兴经济体,必须保持我们必要的主权,以捍卫我们的经济独立性和自主性。不仅仅是经济,人权议题等同样重要。所以我必须与你分享一些观点,我也很希望能听听您对人权问题的看法。
为什么我们要在中国和拉美之间组织关于人权的大型圆桌会议?是因为我们都意识到:我们需要重新审视所谓的“美国式人权价值”。过去,部分中国人曾崇拜西方的人权价值观,特别是在“人权保障”这一理念上,并认为那就是西方、特别是美国的目标,也是我们追求的方向。我们常常认为美国的人权保障就是我们的理想,我们应该像美国那样发展壮大,尤其在人权方面。
但是现在,我们已不再盲目崇拜和追捧西方,甚至开始反思西方人权保障的发展路径。在我看来,西方所谓的人权保护,是建立在“资本”基础上的人权保障方式,却打着“自由”的旗号。如果你在美国是个有钱人,你会享受到很好的人权保护,有清洁的饮用水、高端的居住社区、完善的法律服务、医疗设施和社会保障。但如果你贫困,那么你的人权将会非常糟糕。
在2022至2023年的新冠疫情危机中,美国有200多万人死于感染,其中大多数是贫困群体。因此,从本质上看,这是一场“穷人的危机”。而另一个国家——中国,与此形成鲜明对比。中国的人权保障更加平等,更加关注广大中低收入群体的基本权利。
关于中国特色社会主义人权保障理念和路径,在中国,基本公共服务的价格非常低。我知道在巴西的情况也是类似的,比如说中国地铁票价大约是0.5美元,大概只有美国15%的价格。中国设有“免费法律援助”服务,贫困群体的诉讼成本也非常低。此外,中国的基本医疗高效且费用低廉。即便是月薪1000美元的人,也能享受到较为完整的基础社会服务。这比在美国月薪5000、6000甚至上万美元的人群享受到的服务还要好。
我必须坦言,相比较之下,在中国,富人和官员们的生活并不舒适,因为他们面临高税负,不敢肆无忌惮地敛财。如果公开炫富,他们会受到社会的谴责。官员也被严格管理,我敢说,中国当前的反腐力度是世界上最严厉的。
当然,我知道这些问题在西方舆论中确实存在争议,尤其是在西方的公众讨论和媒体叙事中。例如,西藏、新疆、香港等问题经常被西方媒体批评。我敢说其中大部分是谎言和假新闻,根本不值得反驳。西方国家没有资格指责和抹黑中国,否定中国的人权发展道路。
我认为,有时他们也会像你提到的那样,批评、遏制、妖魔化巴西。所以我们现在必须明确指出,在谈论人权问题时,尤其是在我们即将于七月底召开的中拉人权圆桌会的背景下,我们更应该关注的是:尊重每个国家的人权发展道路。美国也许有其独特的人权发展模式和“人权蓝图”,如果美国人民自己认同,那是他们的选择,我们没有权力指手画脚。同样地,中国也有自己的路径推进人权发展,美国无权进行批评或干涉。
因此,文明的相互尊重与互学互鉴,才是各国在人权发展道路上应有的相处之道。这就是我想与您分享的观点。
同时,我也想请教您一个问题:您对拉丁美洲的人权有什么看法?您如何看待中国与拉美在人权领域未来可能开展的合作前景?
吉马良斯:谢谢你的问题。我想到了我们巴西的人权问题,这是一个非常重要的话题。
巴西曾经历长达21年的军事独裁统治。当我们在1980年代恢复民主时(无论你从1985年还是1990年算起),之后历届巴西政府都在全国致力于推进人权保障。我们签署了几乎所有重要的国际人权公约,以保护我们自己。因为我们有过惨痛的历史教训:1964年,美国支持了巴西国内的军事政变,强加了一场持续21年的军事独裁统治。许多巴西人遭受政治迫害,被关押、被杀害,或被迫流亡海外。
因此,从政治层面来说,人权对我们至关重要;同时从社会层面来看,人权也是巴西社会建设的核心。然而,作为一个发展中国家,我们在人权特别是社会权利方面仍然落后于世界平均水平。我们在社会医疗保健、疫苗接种等方面取得了一些进步,尤其在新冠危机期间,中国给予我们很多帮助。但我们仍有许多问题需要解决。
我确实认为,比如说,如果你是一个较为贫苦的中国人,可能比一个贫穷的巴西人的生活要好得多,因为你将有更多机会接触社会机构,比如医疗保健和卫生设施,而我们在巴西仍未普及。
从法律角度来看,巴西宪法保障每一个巴西人的人权。我们在巴西有免费的医疗保健系统。我有几个美国朋友在巴西遭遇了意外,被送到公立医院,结果他们得到了免费的治疗,没有为整个过程支付一分钱。其中一位对我说:“这是我一生中最民主的经历。”他说自己受伤进入医院,问题被解决,出院时没有任何债务,不欠任何人的钱。
我们的医院也许不是世界上最好的,不像美国那些令人惊叹的医院,但至少是为人民提供基本保障的公立机构。这体现了我们宪法所规定的权利。
当巴西涉及社会人权的讨论时,我们更关注如何为人民提供基本保障。从教育、医疗到基础卫生设施,我们仍面临严重问题。例如在亚马逊森林中心的马瑙斯市,这个拥有250万人口的大城市中,只有10%的人口拥有卫生设施,90%没有污水处理系统,这让他们感染疾病的风险大大增加。你可以想象我们的落后程度。
因此,我们确实有很多地方可以向中国学习,特别是在如何解决这些依然困扰巴西的基本社会问题上。我同意你的观点,也从你那里学到了很多关于巴西和中巴对比的内容。
对话英文版上篇
Feliciano:So pleased to be here to talk to Professor Wang Wen, to discuss the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China, and also the situation in international affairs. Brazil is facing very difficult moments now, because of its ongoing relationship with the United States. I think we have a lot to discuss here.
My first question is exactly about this. Recently, the United States has imposed a 50% tariff increase on Brazil. In April, China also faced a tariff threat of up to 140%, but ultimately China succeeded in making Trump back down.
So, what experiences has China gained from countering U.S. tariff hikes? These are very important lessons for us. Professor Wang Wen, could you please elaborate?
Wang Wen:Thank you, my friend. It’s my pleasure to have this dialogue with you. Firstly, thank you for your recognition of China’s resistance to the U.S. tariff war. Actually, I have to share with you a very important secret: China has been preparing for this tariff war for at least seven years, since the Trump 1.0 era.
Since Trump launched the first tariff war in 2018, starting with the kidnapping of Meng Wanzhou in Canada and the embargo on Huawei, China has abandoned all illusions about the U.S. In our view, the nature of American imperialism has been fully exposed.
The U.S. will not abandon its strategy to contain China. It cannot be considered a selfless, fair, or just country. Relying on the U.S. cannot ensure national security. China must rely on itself. Since then, China has accelerated the process of “de-Americanization,”particularly in three areas: technological independence, resource independence, and trade autonomy.
Let me share my three key points:
1.Technological Independence.China’s annual R&D investment has grown by around 15%. We have caught up in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, not just through software like DeepSeek and TikTok, but also in hardware: drones, robotics, and semiconductor chips.China has increasingly achieved domestic substitution of tech products.This has strengthened our ability to counter U.S. pressure in tech trade.
2.Resource Independence. China has implemented a very precise rare-earth strategy. As you know, China accounts for about 90% of global rare-earth exports. Without China’s rare earths, the U.S. cannot produce many high-end weapons or advanced technology products. That’s why the U.S. had to negotiate and compromise with us.
3.Trade Autonomy. China has promoted a diversified international trade strategy. In the first half of 2025, China’s trade with the U.S. declined by about 20%, but total foreign trade increased by 2.9%.Trade with emerging markets like Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America (including Brazil) grew by 10–15%.
In 2014, U.S. trade made up 20% of China’s external trade; now it is only 10%.In other words, while the U.S. remains important, it is no longer indispensable. China now contributes over 30% of global manufacturing output and plays an irreplaceable role in the global supply chain.
Chinese products are highly competitive globally. So, as you noted, in today’s bilateral trade context, the U.S. needs China more than China needs the U.S.
On the surface, China is resisting U.S. tariff pressure. But in essence, China is fighting against U.S. hegemony and striving for independence from American dominance. We are open to cooperating with the U.S.—but not on our knees.
It must be earned through struggle. China has realized that the U.S. is unreliable. We must rely on national independence and sovereignty.That’s why I say: Brazil is also making similar efforts.
I’ve been to Brazil five times, met many Brazilian friends in São Paulo, Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte.Brazil is also pursuing national autonomy and is not afraid to challenge the U.S.This is admirable.
China supports Brazil’s quest for national independence and economic autonomy, and is committed to building win-win, equal cooperation with Brazil.
I believe Brazil has the wisdom and capacity to confront U.S. tariffs. That’s my suggestion and the experience I wanted to share.
Feliciano:Thank you, Professor Wang Wen.Those were very good points. I do believe there are many similarities in Brazil’s relations with China and with the U.S. Let me share a few figures. In the 1990s, the U.S. accounted for 35% of Brazil’s exports. Today, in 2025, it’s down to 12%. In contrast, China was only 1% in the 1990s,but now accounts for 30% to 35%, depending on how you calculate it.
There’s a clear change in Brazil’s external relations. I think Brazil–China ties today are at their best in decades. President Lula has worked hard since taking office to reframe the bilateral relationship with China. He has a good relationship with President Xi Jinping. Every time they meet, new partnerships are formed—Chinese investments in Brazil increase, and Brazil gains more access to the Chinese market.
However, the U.S. is still powerful. Geography matters: Brazil is closer to the U.S. and around 1.5 million Brazilians live in the U.S. Even though China is our largest trading partner, the U.S. is still our biggest investor.
In terms of cumulative investment stock, the U.S. and EU are still well ahead of China—though China is rapidly catching up. We’ve seen diversification in Chinese investment: originally focused on energy, power grids, and infrastructure, now expanding into other sectors.
In São Paulo, one avenue is now known as “Little China Street” , because of the number of Chinese companies and new Chinese restaurants. It’s an ultra-rich business area. There are reportedly 55 new Chinese companies in that neighborhood alone.
That’s just one city. During President Xi’s state visit to Rio in November last year, many new investments were announced.
The most symbolic was BYD’s acquisition of a factory in Bahia—previously operated by Ford for over 80 years.
Now it’s owned by a Chinese company. Some analysts believe BYD may hold 10% of Brazil’s auto market in the coming years. I’m waiting to buy my first Chinese car.The relationship is changing.
But that doesn’t mean Trump and the U.S. don’t have influence here. There’s a strong political group in Brazil—especially during Bolsonaro’s term—that favored the U.S. over China.
But even Bolsonaro couldn’t ignore the farmers who export to China.They pressured Congress and forced the foreign minister to resign because of his anti-China stance. China didn’t have to do anything. It was the Brazilian farmers—who voted for Bolsonaro—
who stood up and said: “You can’t be aggressive toward China. You must be diplomatic. Even if you dislike China, keep it to yourself.” This showed that Brazil’s economic and political ties with China are now just as important as those with the U.S.
Only two countries can influence Brazil domestically: the U.S., traditionally; and China, as a rising power. We have deep trade ties with both. They both wield leverage over Brazilian society.
But now, Trump’s tariff war poses a new challenge. Since the second wave of tariffs, I’ve been giving interviews daily to Brazilian media. The 50% tariff on Brazil is the highest—only China faced more.
Most countries got 20%–30%; we got 50%. Why? Two reasons:
1.Big U.S. tech companies (Meta, Google, etc.) don’t want to be taxed or regulated in Brazil. There’s an ongoing debate in Congress and the Supreme Court.
2.Trump wants regime change in Brazil.He wants Lula to lose the 2026 electionand be replaced by a right-wing, pro-U.S., anti-China president.
So this is an attempt at regime change,starting with tariffs—and likely escalating into a prolonged crisis.We must devise a national strategy to contain—not necessarily fight—the U.S.,and manage the risks from this economic warfare.
Let me give one final example:The U.S. could sanction Brazil’s military procurement.Many of our weapons are imported from the U.S. or Europe.If they withhold parts—for helicopters, jets, or submarines—we’re extremely vulnerable.
So we must diversify, including our military suppliers. Right now, we don’t use any Chinese weapons in our military. There’s a lack of trust.But look at India–Pakistan conflict: Pakistan used Chinese aircraft and won. It proved that Chinese weapons are world-class—comparable to Western technology. So we must diversify. That’s the key.
Just like you said: China reduced its U.S. trade share from 20% to 10% while growing total trade. Brazil needs to do the same.
Wang Wen:I think you have pointed out a very important point: nowadays we have to rethink about U.S. hegemony. Not only rethink, but also unthink.
Back to our question—you are invited to join our coming human rights round table on the human rights between China and Latin America.
So you mentioned right now—I totally agree that all the countries, especially emerging economies like China and Brazil, we have to keep our necessary sovereignty to protect our economic independence and autonomy. Not only the economy, but also the human rights and other topics.
So I have to share with you that—and then I would like to listen to your viewpoints on human rights.
Why do we want to organize such a big round table between China and Latin America on human rights? Because I think nowadays we face similar conditions. We need to rethink about U.S. human rights value. I don't know whether you know, in the past, some Chinese often worshipped western human rights values, especially in the human rights protection value, and thought the United States was our destination.
I don't know what Brazil thinks about it, but 20 years ago, 30 years ago, we often thought U.S. (human rights model) is our destination. We should grow up like the U.S., especially regarding our human rights.
But now, we no longer worship or yell for the West. We are even reflecting on the path of western human rights protection.
So what I want to share with you is that in my opinion, western human rights protection is based on capital but under the banner of freedom. If you are rich in the U.S., you will enjoy very good human rights protection: clean water, high-end communities, legal service, medical facilities, social security. But if you have no money or are poor, then your human rights will be very bad.
In the COVID-19 crisis from 2022 to 2023, the U.S. had more than 2 million deaths due to the infection—and most of them were poor. So in essence, the COVID-19 crisis was a crisis for the poor.
In contrast, China's human rights protection is more equal and more referred to the vast number of middle- and low-income people.
That’s what I want to share with you—the China’s socialist human rights protection value or path.
In China, the price of basic public service is very low. I know in Brazil it's the same. For example, the subway ticket is about half a dollar, which is 15% of that in the United States.
There are free lawyer assistance services in China, and the cost of lawsuits for the poor is very low. China’s general medical expense is very efficient and cheap. If you have a fever or bad cold, you can go to a hospital at any time and get quick and affordable treatment instead of having a private doctor.
I have worked in the U.S. many years ago, and I can guarantee that in China, people with a monthly salary of 1000 USD enjoy more complete basic social services compared to those with a monthly salary of maybe 5000, 6000, or even 10,000 USD in the U.S.
I have to say in China, the rich and officials are uncomfortable because the taxes on the rich are very high, and they dare not accumulate profits and wealth recklessly. If they show off their wealth publicly, they will be strongly condemned by the society. Officials are strictly managed, and the discipline inspection of Chinese officials is the most strict in the world.
I know those issues are controversial, especially in western public opinion. Another thing I have to share with you is that Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, etc.—they are often accused in the western media. I dare say most of them are lies and fake news, and are not worth refuting. The West has no right to accuse and discredit China’s human rights development.
I think sometimes, as you mentioned, they also contain and demonize Brazil.
So now we have to say, when we are talking about human rights—because we will meet at the end of July on the Round Table on human rights between China and Latin America—what we should pay more attention to is to respect the human rights development path of each country. Perhaps the U.S. has its own blueprint to human rights development, and if the American people agree, we have no right to criticize it. But China also has its own path to human rights development. The U.S. has no right to criticize or intervene.
So mutual respect and mutual learning about civilization are the best ways to treat the human rights development paths of various countries.
So that’s what I want to share with you.
And also I want to ask you—how do you think about Latin American human rights, and how do you think about the coming possible cooperation on human rights fields between China and Latin America?
Feliciano:Thank you for the question. I think of human rights for us here in Brazil—it’s a very important issue.
Because we suffered very much from a military dictatorship in Brazil for 21 years. And when we returned to democracy in the 1980s (depends how you count—1985 or 1990), the new Brazilian governments, one after the other, have enforced human rights in Brazil.
Brazil signed the vast majority, almost the totality, of human rights international treaties to protect ourselves—because we have a history in our own country. There was some resilience supported by the United States in 1964 that imposed a military coup in Brazil. That was 21 years of dictatorship. A lot of Brazilians were persecuted and were sent to jail, or murdered, or sent abroad.
Human rights for us from a political point of view is essential. But also from a social point of view, it is key in Brazil. However, we are a developing country. So when it comes to social rights, mostly speaking, we are lagging behind.
Brazil has improved a lot in terms of social access to health care—from sanitation to vaccines. The help that we received from China during the COVID crisis was very helpful. But we still have a lot to do.
I do think, for example—I don’t know China very well—but I think if you are a poor Chinese, you are probably much better off than a poor Brazilian. Because you will have more access to a number of social agencies of the state of China that can provide them with health care, with sanitation, in a way that we still don’t have.
In Brazil, the constitution protects every single Brazilian—at least from a legal point of view. So, for example, we have free health care in Brazil. I have a couple of American friends who are in Brazil and suffered an accident. They had to be sent to a Brazilian public hospital. They received the entire care for free. They did not pay a single dime for the entire health care.
So I talked to them—how did it go? I mean, you went to a Brazilian hospital, you had injury, they fixed you, and you didn’t pay? One of them said to me: “This was the most democratic experience I had in my life—because I entered a hospital suffering, they fixed my problem, I walked out without any debt. I didn’t owe any money to anyone.”
This is enshrined in our constitution.
Our hospitals are not the best hospitals—not these amazing hospitals that you see in America or that serve the Brazilian rich. These are basic public hospitals, but they fix you, they provide you with basic health care.
So when it comes to social rights and human rights in Brazil, we talk about providing the people with basic means—from education, from a health point of view, from sanitation. We have a serious problem with sanitation in Brazil. For example, if you go to Manaus city in the heart of the Amazon Forest—it’s a big city with 2.5 million people. Only 10% of the population have access to sanitation. 90% of the population have no sewage system. The possibility of getting diseases there is much higher because you have no sanitation in the city.
So you see, we are really lagging behind. We still have a lot to learn from the Chinese experience—how to solve these basic social problems that are still lingering in Brazil.
I agree with you. And also I really learned a lot from you about Brazil.
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