编者按：继2024年9月10日首届中拉人权圆桌会在巴西里约热内卢成功举办之后，第二届中拉人权圆桌会将于7月25日在巴西圣保罗举办。与会前，中国人民大学重阳金融研究院院长、全球领导力学院院长王文对话巴西国际关系中心（CEBRI）学术主任兼高级研究员费里西亚诺·吉马良斯（Feliciano de Sá Guimarães），就中巴关系等一系列问题进行对话。视频在外网引起广泛关注，现将下篇（点击此处可查看上篇）发布如下：（全文约7000字，预计阅读时间15分钟）

点击观看王文与费里西亚诺·吉马良斯对话下半部分视频，时长约16分钟

王文：我想与你分享、也向你请教，关于过去几十年间新平台——特别是金砖国家机制的发展。

你提到我们之间有很多合作潜力。在过去十年里，尤其是最近几年，随着埃及的加入，我们已经进入了一个更大规模的金砖国家合作时代。金砖国家的GDP、原油产量和人口占世界总量的50%，这是全球权力结构的巨大变化。

在这样的背景下，金砖成员的扩大也带来了中国和巴西之间更大的战略协调空间和合作机会，比如能源安全、基础设施融资和其他重要领域。当然，我也必须承认，这样的多边合作也对决策效率提出了挑战。

中国和巴西作为金砖国家的创始成员，应推动建立一个更高效的谈判机制。通过金砖机制，全球南方国家在国际制度中的话语权越来越强，正在建立越来越多的替代治理机制，如新开发银行、应急基金、金砖自由贸易等，推动金融体系多样化。

与此同时，金砖国家也在面临如何在多个国际议程之间取舍的挑战，例如气候正义、技术主权、粮食安全，以及如何改革现有国际治理机制结构（如国际货币基金组织IMF、世界贸易组织WTO和世界卫生组织WHO）的问题。

所以我想请教您，我的朋友，您如何看待新的金砖机制？以及即将展开的中国与巴西之间的合作？不仅仅是在经济、政治、战略层面，也包括在人权和社会领域，您有何见解？

吉马良斯：我在圣保罗大学工作，也在巴西国际关系研究中心（CEBRI）工作，这是巴西专门从事国际关系研究的重要平台。你很了解这个机构。我们接待过许多代表团，包括来自欧洲和美国的外交使团。

每次我与这些代表交流时，我都必须为“金砖机制”进行阐述。他们总会抛出第一个问题：“为什么要有金砖？巴西为什么要参与金砖机制？你们本不该是金砖的一员。”

于是我总要跟他们解释金砖成立的最初理由是什么。为什么巴西在2008年和2009年加入金砖国家？因为当时世界秩序中的三个重要国家——中国、印度和俄罗斯，主动找到巴西说：“巴西，请加入我们。我们要建立一个新兴机制，它的核心目标是推动全球治理体系改革，让你们巴西、还有我们中俄印，在国际机构中拥有更大的话语权，比如国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行（World Bank）。”

我记得当时改革的呼声非常强烈。他们称这为“IMF与世行体系的改革”。而中国可能是当时在IMF中代表性最不足的国家，中国理应拥有约6%的份额配比，但实际仅有1.5%至2%。巴西的情况也类似。

所以金砖机制最初的设想至今未变，我们金砖四国（后来加上南非）就是想要推动全球治理体系的改革。作为交换，中国、印度、俄罗斯给予了巴西总统级别的政治对话通道——总统对总统，总统对总理的直接沟通。这种礼遇是西方国家从未给予我们的。我们从未被邀请加入七国集团（G7）或其他西方主导的机制。但中俄印向我们伸出了橄榄枝，提供了一个以“平等伙伴”身份进行对话的机会。金砖国家承认巴西是平等的合作伙伴。这一点非常重要，因为我们从未感受到西方真正将我们视为平等，总是扮演“次要合作方”的角色，像国际秩序中的“小角色”。

但中国、俄罗斯和印度对我们说：“巴西，你和我们一样重要。让我们一起合作。”这就是金砖国家的起点，初心未改。

当然，金砖机制正在变化。正如您提到的，现在已有11个正式成员，包括伊朗、沙特阿拉伯（虽然我们并不确定沙特是否算正式成员）。一位参加里约金砖峰会的巴西外交官告诉我们，沙特只是受邀成员，并非正式成员。不过，印尼已成为正式成员，其地位非常重要，还有许多合作伙伴，如越南、古巴、玻利维亚等等。这些国家对巴西而言具有重要意义。

起初，巴西对金砖扩员的看法并不那么积极，因为我们曾享有与中国、俄罗斯、印度乃至南非的密切沟通渠道，几乎全年保持紧密对话。年复一年，每一次金砖峰会都伴随着许多会议。

我常常告诉我的学生，也对许多外国外交官说：看看巴西与中国之间的双边关系，有明显变化。你可以清楚地看到，金砖机制发挥了明显作用。它成为一个合作机制，有效促进了中巴关系的发展。因为我们每年都有固定的会晤，金砖会议促成了巴西与中国、巴西与印度、印度与中国、俄罗斯与中国之间关系的深化。金砖机制因此成为双边关系的推动力。

它逐渐演变成成员国之间的合作机制，现在印尼是新成员国，阿联酋也刚刚加入。类似的双边合作也将在它们之间发生。

从巴西的视角来看，我们现在能够开展与印尼等国家的双边关系，这是以前所不具备的渠道和深度。金砖机制已经成为一扇促进双边关系发展的“合作之窗”，这是非常重要的。请看看巴西和中国之间的双边关系。

王文：我完全同意你的观点。金砖国家机制是一个新的合作平台，也为我们提供了新的经济平台，这是一个非常重要的国际交流的平台和机会。正如你提到的，这是一种推动相互尊重的方式。我不确定你是否知道，中国曾拥有相同的命运。在一百年前，几乎所有西方国家都入侵过中国。所以我们现在站起来，我们希望与我们的合作伙伴一同崛起，我们不希望这是孤独的崛起，我们希望能携手共进，与像巴西这样的伙伴和朋友共同崛起。巴西无疑是我们最重要的合作伙伴之一。同时我们也希望利用这一新平台，金砖国家主张通过和平和改革的方式来改善当前的国际经济秩序。

正如你提到的，金砖国家机制带来的是合作机遇，而非殖民主义、灾难、冲突或战争，而是合作、贸易、繁荣以及共同进步。我认为这是一个在人类文明进程中的巨大进步。这是我的一些观点与你分享。

我的最后一个问题是，或许我们可以聊聊未来：你如何看待中巴合作未来十年内的潜力？有哪些挑战我们不可忽视？你对这些问题有什么观点？

吉马良斯：感谢你的提问，我认为我们确实有需要改进的一面——关于中巴之间的合作，金砖国家机制也为这方面提供了支持。问题的核心在于我们要用更多雷亚尔和人民币进行结算以扩大贸易。

我举两个例子。在美欧对俄罗斯实施制裁之后，巴西中央银行意识到，我们的外汇储备——当时高达3500亿美元——完全依赖美国国债，因此必须实现多元化。在制裁之前，我们90%的外汇储备是以美元形式持有。制裁之后，这个比例下降到了75%。目前我们有5%的外汇储备以人民币计价。

但使用人民币进行贸易仍然较为困难。正如你所知，中国对人民币实行严格的资本和货币管制。因此，我们无法快速扩大人民币在外汇储备中的占比。但我们正在慢慢推进这一过程，这是一项正在进行中的工作。我们需要继续朝这个方向努力。

为实现这一目标，我们需要达成更多法律协议，在巴西金融监管机构和中国金融监管机构之间建立更紧密的合作关系，以便巴西能够在外汇储备中更广泛地使用人民币。

第二点是贸易。目前在巴西设立的中资银行数量仍然很少。但如他们所言，问题已经非常明确，中巴之间使用人民币进行贸易结算的机制正在逐步建立。

由于中国有大量巴西企业开展业务，这些企业完全接受以人民币收款。因此，在对华贸易中不再需要依赖美元结算。我无法提供确切数字，但根据我此前看到的统计数据，中巴之间约有5%至10%的贸易额是直接以雷亚尔与人民币结算的，无需通过美元作为中介。

我们已经具备了推动此类结算的法律工具和框架，我认为这种趋势只会持续增长。但下一步的关键，在于中方能否做出一些法律上的调整。归根到底，这与资本市场机制密切相关。这些改革将进一步促进巴西扩大人民币的使用范围。因此，这是我们需要改进的两项重点内容，在我们双边关系中具有重要意义。

接下来是我认为非常关键的最后一点。如果你了解卢拉总统提出的产业政策——它名为“新工业巴西”，其核心理念是必须推进巴西的再工业化。

不可否认，中国的崛起使巴西工业的竞争力面临挑战，因为许多中国企业效率极高，产量大、成本低。这种现象不仅发生在巴西，也发生在欧洲，乃至全球。因此，我们必须对此进行调整。

我认为这一转变已经开始发生。例如，在卢拉总统与习近平主席最近的会晤中，巴西政府成功争取到若干中国企业在巴西工业领域进行新一轮投资，包括比亚迪、长征汽车等企业。

我们需要更多中国的先进技术，如人工智能等前沿领域。我自己用过ChatGPT，但我也每天在用DeepSeek。我希望能够使用更多这样的技术，并需要更大的获取渠道。

因此，在巴西开展工业投资的中国企业越多，选择在巴西本地生产、制造产品的中资企业越多，我们双边关系的发展就会越稳固、越有实质性进展。

在巴西有很多声音认为，当前的中巴双边贸易尽管对巴西来说是积极的，我们对华贸易顺差达400亿美元，但仍然过度依赖大宗商品与石油出口。

我们需要摆脱这一单一结构。因为如果将中巴贸易与美巴贸易相比较，我们向美国出口的工业制成品要多得多，而对中国的工业品出口比例偏低。所以这种双边贸易结构需要进行再平衡，以进一步深化中巴关系。

以上是三个重点方向，我认为在未来可以改善我们双边关系的三个方面。

最后一点，我们必须就武器系统问题展开对话。巴西军队需要开始采购中国的武器装备，我们必须改变对西方国家在军事装备上的依赖。以上就是我认为值得推进与改善的几个关键合作领域。

王文：谢谢您的分享，我完全赞同您的观点。您刚才提到了中巴之间的互补优势，我认为我们确实需要进一步深化这种互补优势，以协调应对全球共同挑战。因此我完全赞同您的观点。

我的看法是，一方面，我们必须继续深化彼此的互补合作；另一方面，我认为中巴合作必须避免受到政治干预的影响。我必须向您说明并与您探讨：当前美国正试图引导巴西减少对中国的依赖，并试图削弱金砖国家机制下的合作。同时，欧美国家也在阻挠中巴之间在5G领域的合作。

这也正好呼应您刚才提到的产业合作问题。与此同时，我认为中巴之间在社会与文化层面也存在一些摩擦，我们还必须共同面对全球性挑战，比如气候变化。

即便如此，我们仍认为中巴合作需要战略性规划。为此，我提出了“中巴2035共同议程”的倡议。我认为接下来的十年至关重要。

这意味着什么？因为十年之后，中国有90%甚至100%的可能将取代美国成为全球第一大经济体。因此，当我们展望下一个十年时，我们应当设计一套机制，以确保推动中巴战略伙伴关系的升级路线图。通过循序渐进、务实的方式，释放中巴合作的内生动力，同时逐步减少对西方的依赖。

中国目前已经在推进自身的“去美国化”战略。这也是我们计划于本月底（2025年7月）在巴西举办“中拉人权圆桌会议”的原因之一。我们的目标是加强中拉相互交流，特别是中巴之间的交流。所以我完全同意您的观点：中巴两国也正面临新的挑战，以及一些全球性的共同挑战。

我想在最后对我们的对话做一个总结。我认为中国与巴西都是具有独立地位的全球性大国。中巴两国合作需要从资源互补上升到制度共生的层面，并进一步加强结构性互信。

对话英文版下篇

Wang Wen：I’d like to share with you—and also I’d like to learn from you—about the new platform in the last decades, about the BRICS mechanism. Because you mentioned that we have a lot of cooperation potential.

In the past one decade, China and Brazil have had a lot of cooperation. Especially in recent years, with the acceptance of Egypt—as it will be the country after Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE—we have now entered the area of the greater BRICS and the expansion of BRICS.

BRICS countries’ GDP, crude oil production, and population all account for about 50% of the world’s total, which is a huge change in the global power structure.

So I want to share with you: under the new background, the expansion of BRICS has also expanded the strategic coordination space between China and Brazil, bringing more opportunities for cooperation in energy security, infrastructure financing and other areas.

And of course, on the other hand, I have to say that it also brings a certain challenge in the decision-making efficiency. So that’s why I want to say that China and Brazil are the founding members of the BRICS and need to promote the establishment of an efficient negotiation mechanism.

For example, through the BRICS cooperation, the Global South has more institutional discourse power and is becoming increasingly powerful. BRICS countries are building more and more alternative governance mechanisms to promote financial system diversification—such as establishing the New Development Bank, the emergency fund, and promoting the BRICS of free trade era.

And on the other hand, BRICS countries are also restructuring the priority of the international agenda—in areas of climate justice, technological sovereignty, and food security—and reforming the structure of existing governance mechanisms, such as IMF, WTO, and WHO.

So I want to share, and I want to ask you, my friend: how do you think about the new BRICS mechanism? And how do you think about the coming China–Brazil cooperation—not only in the economic level, political level, strategic level, but also in the human rights level and the social level?

So how do you think?

Feliciano：I work here in the University of São Paulo, and I work for CEBRI—which is a Brazilian center for international relations. You know it very well.

We received many diplomatic delegations, including from Europe and from the U.S. And every single time I meet with them, I have to justify BRICS.

So the first question they always post to me is: “Why BRICS? Why is Brazil in BRICS? You shouldn’t be a part of BRICS.”

Then I always remind them the first reason of being BRICS—why did Brazil join BRICS in 2008–2009?

Because three very important countries of the global order—China, India, and Russia—came to Brazil and said: “Look, Brazil, join us. We’re going to create this grouping whose main goal is to reform global governance—to give you (Brazil), and us (China, Russia, India), more say in international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.”

I remember back then the necessity to reform. They called it the “system reform of the IMF and the World Bank.” China was maybe the most underrepresented country at the IMF. At the IMF, China should have 6% of the quotas and had only 1.5%–2%. Brazil was that too.

So that remains the same idea: that we four—and five with South Africa—wanted to reform global governance.

In exchange for that, China, India and Russia gave to Brazil political access—president to president, president to prime minister—in a way that the West has never offered to us. We have never been offered to be part of the G7, or any other mechanism of cooperation within the West.

But China, Russia and India offered us an opportunity to talk as equals. BRICS recognized Brazil as an equal partner. That’s very important—because we didn’t feel that we were recognized as equal by the West. We were always the junior partner. The smaller kids in the neighborhood.

But China, Russia and India said: “Look Brazil, you are just as big as us, as important as us. Let’s work together.”

That was the origin of BRICS. That remains the same.

But BRICS changed. As you mentioned, now we have 11 full members—we have Iran, Saudi Arabia (we never know if it’s there or not). A Brazilian diplomat for the BRICS summit here in Rio said Saudi Arabia was just an invited member, not a full member.

But we have Indonesia—very important as a full member. And all the partners—Vietnam, Cuba, Bolivia—you name it. A number of countries. For Brazil.

Initially, the expansion of BRICS was not so positive. Because as I said—look, we had the privilege to talk to China, Russia, India, South Africa—very closely throughout the year. Every summit of the BRICS came with many meetings.

I always tell my students—and also all these foreign diplomats—I tell them: look at the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China, before BRICS and after BRICS. You can clearly see that BRICS worked as a mechanism. They improved the relationship between Brazil and China.

Because we met every year. More BRICS were able to promote Brazil and China, Brazil and India, India and China, Russia and China—to improve relationships.

Thereby BRICS became an impetus for our bilateral relationships. So it became a mechanism of cooperation amongst ourselves.

Now Indonesia is a new member. Now the Emirates is a new member. This will happen as well.

We’re going to refer to the Brazilian point of view. We now are going to be able to have a bilateral relationship with Indonesia, for example, in a way that we did not have before.

BRICS became sort of a window of opportunity that fosters this bilateral relationship. That is important.

Yes—look at the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China.

Wang wen：I totally agree with you.The BRICS mechanism is a new platform that has provided us with a new economic foundation.It offers a very important opportunity for international exchange and cooperation.

As you mentioned, it is a way to promote mutual respect.I don’t know whether you know or not, but China once shared the same destiny as many other Global South countries in the past.

About 100 years ago, almost all Western countries invaded China.So now, when we rise up, we want to rise up together with our partners.We do not want a lonely rise; we want to rise hand in hand with partners and friends like Brazil.

Brazil, of course, is one of our most important partners and friends.We also want to use this new platform to promote peaceful and reform-based approaches among BRICS countries,in order to improve the current international economic order.

As you mentioned, the BRICS mechanism brings cooperation opportunities—not colonization, disaster, conflict, or war,but rather cooperation, trade, prosperity, and common progress.

I believe this is a significant step forward in the advancement of human civilization.These are some of my views, and I would also like to share a few additional thoughts.

My friend Feliciano, my final question is:perhaps we can talk about the future.

How do you see the potential for cooperation between China and Brazil in the next ten years?And what challenges do you think we must pay close attention to?What are your views on these questions?

Feliciano：Thank you for the question.I think one of the things we really need to improve is the cooperation between Brazil and China.

The BRICS mechanism provides support for this,and the core of the issue lies in expanding our trade using more renminbi and reais.

Let me give you two examples: After the U.S. and European sanctions against Russia, the Brazilian Central Bank realized that our foreign reserves — then totaling $350 billion —were entirely based on U.S. bonds, and therefore had to be diversified.

Before the sanctions, 90% of our reserves were in U.S. dollars. Afterwards, that proportion fell to 75%, and currently, 5% of our reserves are in renminbi.

But trading in renminbi remains difficult,as China maintains strict capital and currency controls.

So we cannot rapidly increase the RMB proportion in our reserves,but we are moving slowly in that direction.

That’s the first point. We need to continue this effortTo achieve this goal, we need more legal agreements between the Brazilian and Chinese financial regulators, so that Brazil can more broadly adopt renminbi as part of its foreign reserves.

The second point is trade.There are only a few Chinese banks currently operating in Brazil.But as they say, the issue became clear —the mechanism for renminbi trade settlement between Brazil and China is still under development.

Since many Brazilian companies are operating in China, they fully accept payment in renminbi, so there is no need for U.S. dollar settlement.

Although I don’t have the exact numbers, according to recent statistics I saw, about 5% to 10% of Brazil–China trade is now settled directly in renminbi and reais, without using U.S. dollars as an intermediary.

We already have the legal tools and frameworks for that, and I believe this trend will only continue to grow. However, the next key step depends on whether China can make some legal adjustments.

Ultimately, this is tied to capital market regulation. Such reforms will further expand Brazil’s use of renminbi. So, these are two critical issues that we need to address in our bilateral relationship.

Now, I want to highlight one final and very important point. If you examine President Lula’s industrial policy — called “Nova Indústria Brasil” — you’ll find that reindustrializing Brazil is essential.

However, China’s rise has created real challenges for Brazil’s industry, since many Chinese companies are extremely efficient and have much lower production costs.

This phenomenon not only affects Brazil, but also Europe and other regions globally. Therefore, we must respond with adjustments.

And I believe this transformation is already underway. In the most recent meetings between President Lula and President Xi Jinping,

Brazilian authorities successfully convinced several Chinese companies —including BYD, Great Wall, and others —to invest in Brazil’s industrial sector. We need more Chinese technology, particularly in advanced fields such as artificial intelligence.

I use ChatGPT myself, but I also use DeepSeek every day.I want access to more of this kind of technology. I need broader access channels. So the more Chinese companies invest in Brazil’s industry and choose local manufacturing, the more stable and advanced our bilateral relations will become.

Although our current bilateral trade is generally positive for Brazil — with a $40 billion trade surplus —it still relies heavily on commodities and oil.

We must shift away from this one-dimensional structure. In comparison, Brazil exports many more industrial products to the U.S. than to China.

Our industrial exports to China are disproportionately low. So we need to rebalance this bilateral trade structure to further deepen the relationship between China and Brazil.

These are the three main areas of focus.I believe they could significantly improve our bilateral relationship in the future.

And finally, we must open a conversation about weapon systems. Brazil’s armed forces should begin purchasing Chinese weapons.

We must reduce our military dependence on Western countries.These, I believe, are key cooperation areas worth promoting and improving.

Wang wen：Thank you for your sharing. I totally agree with you.You just mentioned the complementary advantage between China and Brazil. I think we really need to further deepen this kind of complementary advantage while addressing global challenges together. So I totally agree with you.

My opinion is: On one hand, we must continue to deepen our complementary cooperation; On the other hand, I think China–Brazil cooperation must avoid political interference.

I have to explain and discuss with you that the United States is now trying to induce Brazil to reduce its dependence on China, and is also undermining cooperation under the BRICS mechanism.

At the same time, European and American countries are also obstructing China–Brazil cooperation in the field of 5G.This echoes what you just said about industrial cooperation. I also think there is some social and cultural friction between China and Brazil.

In addition, we must face global challenges together, such as climate change. Despite all this, I still believe that China–Brazil cooperation needs strategic planning.

That’s why I proposed the initiative of the “China–Brazil Common Agenda 2035.” I believe the next ten years are crucial. What does that mean? Because after ten years, China has a 90% or even 100% probability of becoming the largest economy in the world, overtaking the United States.

So when we look to the next decade, we should design a mechanism to guarantee a roadmap for upgrading the strategic partnership between China and Brazil.

Step by step, pragmatically, we need to release the inner momentum of cooperation, and at the same time gradually reduce dependence on the West.As I mentioned, China is now promoting its own “de-Americanization” strategy.

This is also one of the reasons why we are planning to hold the “China–Latin America Human Rights Roundtable” in Brazil at the end of this month (July 2025).Our goal is to strengthen mutual exchange between China and Latin American countries, especially between China and Brazil.So that’s why I totally agree with you that China and Brazil now face new challenges, as well as global common challenges.

In short, I want to summarize our dialogue at the end.I believe China and Brazil are both independent global powers.The cooperation between China and Brazil should be upgraded from resource complementarity to institutional symbiosis, and further to structural mutual trust.