今年六月份，中国遭遇了十多年来最严重的流动性危机。中国央行最终给应承担责任的金融机构采取了一些缓解举措，从而扭转了形势。

　　部分西方媒体将中国此次的流动性危机与2008年美国金融危机相提并论纯属一派胡言乱语，他们根本是犯了基本的经济学逻辑错误。美国在2008年遭遇的根本不是流动性危机，即立即偿付能力不足。美国当时面临的是资不抵债危机，即美国银行的负债超过其资产。虽然中国金融机构在2013年6月面临流动性问题，但没有任何一家主要银行倒闭。相反，2008年美国有为数众多的机构崩溃了。将中美这两次危机相提并论，就像是似是而非地宣称同为疾病的流感和黑死病是同样严重一样可笑。

　　然而，从医学角度而言，治愈令人不舒服的流感副作用是需要时间的。因而，预测中国未来的经济发展趋势就需要分析中国此次流动性危机背后的原因，以及类似的事件将来是否再有发生的可能。这样的分析显示，没有人能提前预见经济危机发生的确切形式，但是有可能预测到经济危机的发生——如笔者在人大重阳授课时就曾预测的一样，中国的经济学们也预测到了中国可能发生的危机，比如我下文将要提到的林毅夫。在六月的问题得到处理后，中国是否再会发生类似的危机取决于造成目前危机的关键错误是否已经解决了。

　　银行间拆借利率飙升至13%的峰值是六月危机的主要征兆。支付意愿显示金融机构急需现金。分析潜在的疾病和其征兆之间的联系有助于了解疾病发生的原因。

　　导致此次流动性危机的核心问题就是中国抛弃了创造过去35年世界最快经济增速的政策，转而主张“消费带动增长”——一个“扩大消费需求将会导致企业生产更多的消费品，进而带动民众生活水平快速提高”的理论。不幸的是，事实上主张“消费带动增长”概念的这些人并不明白投资才是拉动经济增长的主要来源，也根本不明白什么是真正的市场经济。

　　市场经济注定只能是“利润带动增长”。产出不会因为‘需求’而增长，而只会为利润而增长。正是不懂这一点，此次经济才会发生流动性危机，原因是按照之前“需求拉动产出”的错误理念，主要的政策建议就是增加消费占GDP比重，而为了付得起高消费，工资在GDP中的比重就需提高。

　　提高工资占 GDP的比重必然意味着降低企业利润占GDP的比重。实际上“消费带动增长”理论的确提倡了挤占利润，因为企业以高于GDP增长的速度来涨工资了。很遗憾，中国今年第一季度就执行了此项政策，使得消费增长幅度显著快于投资——也就意味着工资增速远远快于GDP。远未达到积极效果，在市场经济体系下这样做的唯一结果是——连锁反应后的经济危机，它在六月如约而至。

　　工资增速远快于GDP增速挤压了企业利润。截至2013年5月止，中国A股市场上市公司整体利润（剔除通货膨胀因素后）增长了0%。因此，私企和国企都开始缩减投资。中国2013 年前5个月的固定资产投资增速比前4个月回落0.2%，私人投资增速同比下降0.1%。

　　这反过来又导致经济增速放缓。中国GDP增速从2012年第四季度的7.9%降至2013年第一季度的7.7%，这也给企业带来更大利润率压力。中国人民币汇率升值进一步挤压了企业利润，这加重了中国出口商出口难度。

　　这不可避免地影响到信贷市场。随着利润增长放缓，某些情况开始变得消极，企业需要贷款填补现金流动量的缺口。同时，因为企业正用现金去填补支付缺口，而非用于投资，贷款刺激经济增长的效果减弱。由于大多数领域的利润被挤压，企业开始把他们拥有的投资资源转向更有利可图的市场，尤其是房地产市场，这也进一步推高了房地产市场价格。企业的盈利能力下降表现在其贷款需求膨胀，徒劳无益的贷款加速了房价增长并提高房地产价格的上行压力。

　　为了遏制信贷激增，中国央行试图收紧流动性。但这只是指标不治本——就像按住水痘来治天花，病还是没根治。事实上情况会更加恶化，企业的现金流受到两个方向的挤压——上文所述的工资挤压和央行的流动性收紧。双重压力再继续下去将会使企业财务崩溃。因而，中国央行不得不改变其遏制信贷激增的初衷而向银行注入流动性资金。

　　然而央行注入流动性资金只解决了问题的一方面，燃眉之急可解，但根本问题没治，除非企业利润被挤压的局面完全被扭转过来。

　　如果中国最后还是发生了危机，那一定是中国银行体系的不完善所致。和每个国家一样，中国必须具备一个“大到不能倒”的银行核心体系。可是，这样的大银行永远不可能充分反映小企业的需求。在私人银行主导的英国，每天都能听到小企业对大银行没完没了的抱怨。中国目前尚未建立一套充分反应小企业需求的“小到能倒”的银行体系。相反只有像影子一样无法充分监督的大银行系统。

　　但是同样的因素保证了中国经济快速增长35 年，也让经济学家准确预测中国的这一经济奇迹成为可能，这显示克服这些问题对中国来说相对容易。因为事实上是他们自身的经济政策出了问题，而不是客观的经济因素约束所致。

　　中国2012年在世界银行关于中国报告的影响下，于当年的上半年实施了缩紧银根的类似政策，结果也导致中国经济增速放缓。但是此项政策在2012年年中被推翻了，中国在当时实施了投资刺激政策，因而阻止了金融危机的发生，中国经济增速也从7.4% 加速升至7.9%。但不幸的是，中国在2013年又同样实施了持续时间更长的错误政策，因而导致了6月的流动性危机。

　　世界银行前高级副行长林毅夫最近曾表示：“那些倡导中国经济以消费为主的，都是公然地要求我国很快地陷入危机。”遗憾的是，从六月发生的事件看来，这简直是一语成谶。

　　中国有大量反对导致六月危机错误政策的力量。企业不想利润被挤压；经济放缓会导致生活水准的增速放缓，而这会引发消费者的不满。因为中国金融市场的六月事件是流动性危机，而非偿付能力，而且中国的银行仍旧维持较高的利润，其资产也远远大于其负债，因而这未对中国银行系统造成全面损害。六月危机表明，即使是在拥有强大的宏观经济基本面的中国，混乱的经济理论也会造成极大的危害。“消费带动增长”的不合理理论必然将挤压企业利润，也不可避免地会导致经济危机。

　　六月市场信贷危机爆发纯粹是受市场经济影响。这提醒每个人，在市场经济体系下，永远不会是“消费带动增长”，而只会是“利润带动增长”。希望中国吸取这次适当的教训，不要再重蹈覆辙。

　　（约翰·罗斯，现为中国人民大学重阳金融研究院高级研究员。2000年至2008年间任英国伦敦经济与商业政策署署长，此职位相当于现在的伦敦副市长级别。）

　　Behind China`s liquidity crisis By John Ross

　　Comment(s)Print E-mail China.org.cn, July 2, 2013 Adjust font size: In June, China suffered its worst liquidity crisis in over a decade. Fortunately, the Central Bank reversed the situation by extending liquidity operations to responsible financial institutions.

　　In the West, some sections of the media exploded with wild comparisons to the US financial crisis in 2008. Such comparisons were nonsense, however, based on an elementary economic mistake. The U.S. did not suffer a liquidity crisis in 2008. It faced an insolvency crisis. The former is a shortage of means to meet immediate payments; the latter occurs when banks` liabilities exceed their capital. In 2013, Chinese financial institutions faced liquidity problems, but not a single major institution failed. Numerous U.S. financial institutions collapsed in 2008. Comparing the two events is rather like claiming that the flu and the bubonic plague are equally serious, since both are illnesses!

　　But not being the bubonic plague doesn`t mean that in its own terms flu is not unpleasant, or that it doesn`t have side effects that last for some time. Therefore, it is important to analyze the crisis` causes in order to determine whether similar events will recur. While the exact form of crisis was not predictable - it never is - both Chinese economists and the present author predicted why there would be problems for the Chinese economy. Now that June`s symptoms have been somewhat ameliorated, whether a similar crisis emerges in the future depends on whether the key mistake that led to the present one is resolved.

　　The key symptom of June`s crisis was a spike in interbank lending rates to a 13 percent peak. Willingness to pay this indicated that financial institutions urgently needed cash. Analyzing the links between the underlying disease and the symptoms shows why.

　　The core problem that led to the liquidity crisis was advocacy that China abandon the policies which for 35 years have made it the world`s most rapidly growing economy, in favor of something termed"consumer led growth," a theory that boosting consumer demand will lead companies to a more rapid increase in production of consumer goods and a more rapid rise in living standards. Unfortunately, this theory factually doesn`t take into account that investment is the main source of economic growth, and conceptually it doesn`t understand what a market economy actually is.

　　A market economy necessarily can only be "profit led growth." Output does not increase due to "demand," but only because of profit. Failure to understand this pushed the economy towards the liquidity crisis via its key policy proposal that the percentage of consumption in China`s GDP be increased, and to pay for these purchases the percentage of wages in GDP should increase.

　　Increasing the percentage of wages in the GDP necessarily means reducing the percentage of profits. Therefore the theory of "consumer led growth" in reality advocated that a profits squeeze should be applied to companies via wages growing more rapidly than GDP. Regrettably, in the first part of 2013, this policy was pursued, with China`s consumption rising significantly more rapidly than its investment, an indication wages were rising more rapidly than GDP. This produced the only possible consequence in a market economy: a chain reaction leading to crisis, which duly broke out in June in credit markets.

　　Wages rising more rapidly than GDP squeezed company profits. By May 2013, the overall profit increase by companies listed on China`s A-share market was zero percent - they were falling in inflation-adjusted terms. Consequently, both private and state-owned companies starting reining in investments. In the first five months of 2013, growth in fixed assets investment was 0.2 percent lower than growth in the first four months, and private investment growth was 0.1 percent less than it had been a year before.

　　This, in turn, led to economic slowdown. GDP growth fell from 7.9 percent in the last quarter of 2012 to 7.7 percent in the first quarter of 2013, placing greater pressure on profits. Profits were then squeezed further by the rise in the RMB exchange rate, which created difficulties for China`s exporters.

　　This inevitably affected credit markets. With profit growth slowing, and in some cases, becoming negative, companies needed credits to plug holes in cash flows. Simultaneously, as companies were using cash to plug payment holes and not to invest, credit became less effective at stimulating growth. Given that profits were squeezed in most sectors, companies diverted what resources they could into markets which were more profitable - most notably, real estate, fuelling price increases in this sector. The pressure on company profitability therefore expressed itself via ballooning demand for credit, ineffectualness of credit in accelerating growth and excess upward pressure on real estate prices.

　　To attempt to stop ballooning credit, the Central Bank tightened liquidity. But this tackled symptoms, not the disease - rather like treating chicken pox by pressing on the spots. The disease was therefore not cured. Indeed the situation worsened as companies` cash flows were now squeezed from two directions - from the fundamental processes described above and by the Central Bank`s liquidity tightening. If this dual pressure had continued, there would have been a financial collapse. Therefore, the Central Bank had to alter course and inject credits.

　　By supplying liquidity, the Central Bank took pressure off companies from one side, thereby overcoming the immediate crisis. But the underlying cause of the problem will not be overcome until the company profits squeeze is fully reversed.

　　Finally, while a crisis would have occurred anyway, it was worsened by the incomplete structure of China`s banking system. China, like every country, must possess a core of system making banks that are "too big to fail." Such huge banks will never be adequately responsive to small companies` needs, however. In the U.K., which has a private dominated banking system, there are endless complaints by smaller companies about large banks! China has not yet created an adequate system of "small enough to fail" banks, which are responsive to smaller companies, around its large core lenders. Instead, an insufficiently regulated shadow banking system developed.

　　But the same fundamental factors that made it possible to accurately predict rapid growth of China`s economy for 35 years show it is relatively easy for China to overcome these problems, as they are self-inflicted policy problems, not objective constraints.

　　In 2012, under the influence of the World Bank report on China, similar policies were pursued in the first half of the year. They also led to a growth slowdown. When this policy was reversed in mid-2012, with an investment stimulus, growth accelerated from 7.4 percent to 7.9 percent. In 2013, unfortunately, the wrong policy was pursued for longer and therefore led to June`s crisis.

　　Lin Yifu, former senior vice president of the World Bank, recently stated: "Those who advocate that China`s economy should rely on consumption are, in fact, pushing the country into a crisis." Regrettably, June`s events confirmed these words.

　　Large forces in China are working against the errors that led to the June crisis. Companies do not want profits pressured. Slower economic growth will lead to less rapid increase in living standards, creating dissatisfaction among consumers. As June`s events in China`s financial market were a liquidity crisis, not one of solvency, and China`s banks remain highly profitable with assets far outweighing liabilities, no systemic damage has been done to China`s banking system. June`s events simply demonstrated that even in a country with China`s very strong macroeconomic fundamentals, an incoherent theory can wreak havoc. A non-sequitur like "consumer led growth," which necessarily applies a profit squeeze to companies, inevitably leads to economic crisis.

　　June`s credit market explosions were simply the market economy reminding everyone that, within it, there can never be "consumer led growth." Only "profit led growth" is possible.

　　Hopefully the appropriate lessons have been drawn.