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Your Present Location: LATEST INSIGHTSRussia Analytical Report, Aug. 29-Sept. 6, 2022
Source: Russia Matters Published: 2022-09-07
5 Ideas to Explore
It will become impossible for Russia to finance its war in Ukraine at the current level of $500 million a day as Western sanctions on the Russian economy will increasingly bite, according to Oleg Itskhoki’s estimates. Itskhoki and other Russian economists polled by Meduza believe the full brunt of these punitive measures are yet to be felt by the country’s economy. “Russia’s economy is not going to collapse in a way that forces a halt to the Kremlin’s war effort,” but the country does “face a sharp recession, a long grind of lower living standards and little hope for a quick rebound,” according Chris Miller, a U.S. expert on Russian economy.
The U.S. should not seek to transform Russia or China because advocating for regime change would likely prove irrelevant or counterproductive, according to Richard Haas. The U.S. should prioritize the promotion of order over the promotion of democracy, Haas argues in Foreign Affairs. That might prove to be a very difficult mission for the U.S. if Russia is indeed “promoting something else entirely: world disorder with no rules,” as Angela Stent tells Foreign Policy.
Mikhail Gorbachev remembered for his role in peaceful disintegration of the Soviet empire: Following the death of the Soviet leader on Aug. 30, Vladislav Zubok writes that Gorbachev’s greatest achievement was bringing “a peaceful end to the Cold War,” but notes that his place in Russian history is “still to be determined” with Russian nationalists blaming him for allowing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Graham Allison also credits the last Soviet leader with ending the Cold War. “If you ask yourself which single individual contributed most to the resolution without war of four decades of Cold War between the U.S.-led free world and the Soviet Union, it was Mikhail Gorbachev,” Allison writes. Gorbachev should also be remembered for his refusal to use force to prevent the disintegration of the socialist bloc that preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to Paula J. Dobriansky. One should not, however, forget the economic turmoil that followed the end of Gorbachev’s rule, according to Paul Krugman. “Russia turned away from socialism and toward a market economy. And the results were disastrous,” Krugman reminds us.
It’s a myth that Moscow is winning the energy battle, according to Fatih Birol. First its short-term revenue gain is more than offset by the loss of both trust and markets that it faces for many years to come. Second, there will be significant medium-term impacts of the tougher international sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sector. The growing share of Russian oil production had been set to come from resources that will be hard to recover without Western know-how. Third, Russia’s LNG expansion plans are now back on the drawing board in part because of the sanctions, Birol writes in FT.
Has the Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated that tanks are obsolete? Not so, according to Rob Lee. “Russia’s heavy tank losses can be explained by employment mistakes, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support and Ukrainian artillery” rather than by the obsolesce of tanks as such, this retired U.S. Marine writes in War on the Rocks. Meanwhile, a contributor to the U.S. Marine Gazette saw Russia’s “program of missile strikes” in Ukraine exploiting a “capability that was nothing short of revolutionary.”
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
“Washington should ... take several steps but two of the most important are dialing in ‘peaceful’ reactors as prepositioned nuclear weapons into its strategic deterrence strategy and rethinking its enthusiasm for exporting reactors even into war zones.”
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“The first task requires clarifying when, and, if it ever, it would make sense for U.S. forces to fire on reactors overseas. It also entails determining how our forces might best deter and protect against attacks on friends’ reactors meant to harm or coerce them.”
“The second task demands examining what can be done physically to protect existing reactors overseas where U.S. troops are or might be deployed. It also requires assessing how prudent constructing new nuclear plants might be in or near likely war zones and where those zones might lie.”
"A repeat of Chernobyl [at Zaporizhzhia NPP] appears unlikely, observed Professor Timothy Mousseau, who studies the biological effects of nuclear disasters at the University of South Carolina, who says that while a missile strike has the potential to release a cloud of radioactive particles, it would not be a sustained nuclear reaction, and there wouldn't be the same kind of meltdown and massive release of fresh particles that result from fission of uranium and plutonium. "
[But if a meltdown does occur, it would] “pose tremendous risks to human and environmental health. The power plant sits alongside the Dnipro River, Europe's fourth largest, which if contaminated, could spread radioactivity all the way to the Black Sea. In the immediate area of the plant, staff and soldiers could become violently ill. Some of them have protective gear, but others are completely exposed, and within half an hour could be overcome with fever, nausea and vomiting due to the radiation, which in severe cases can be fatal. Outside the plant, those who have inhaled radioactive smoke or were exposed to lower levels of radiation are now at risk of various cancers that could affect them down the line.”
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
No significant developments.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
No significant developments.
Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
“After six months of war in Ukraine, some observers have insisted that ‘we are seeing the very nature of combat change’ and that tanks, along with fighter jets and warships, ‘are being pushed into obsolescence.’ But it is too soon to write off the tank, and we should resist jumping to other sweeping conclusions about the future of warfare based on a conflict whose lessons are not yet clear. There is still much about this war that is not known from open sources, and there is good reason to think that the conditions that marked its early phases will not necessarily be relevant to future conflicts.”
“The available data from Ukraine, as well as the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, indicate that tanks are still critical in modern warfare and their vulnerabilities have been exaggerated. Russia’s heavy tank losses can be explained by employment mistakes, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support and Ukrainian artillery.”
“While the Russian military would have been better served in Ukraine by having more infantry and fewer tanks, tanks will continue to be important systems in ground warfare. They remain a key ground component of combined-arms warfare, without which other arms are more vulnerable. Infantry are vulnerable when attempting to seize defensive positions, meaning tanks still play a critical role during offensive operations. Anti-tank guided missiles certainly cannot replace the tank’s role in supporting maneuver.”
“Crucially, NATO tanks generally have better crew protection than Russia’s, and NATO militaries would be unlikely to eschew combined arms as the Russian military did in the early stages of its invasion. So not all lessons from this war directly apply to NATO. Drawing similar sweeping conclusions based on Russian tank losses from this period would also be a mistake. The evidence from Ukraine reveals that tanks are still very relevant in modern warfare.”
“The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Part II: The mental and moral realms,” Marinus, Marine Corps Gazette via Imetatronink and Johnson’s Russia List , August 2022.
“One way to shed a little light upon this conundrum is to treat Russian operations on each of the three major fronts of the war as a distinct campaign. … [E]ach of these campaigns followed a model that had been part of the Russian operational repertoire for a very long time. Such a scheme, however, fails to explain why the Russian leadership applied particular models to particular sets of operations. Resolving that question requires an examination of the mental and moral purposes served by each of these three campaigns.”
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“[D]uring the first few days of the Russian invasion ... the fast-moving Russian columns .... convinced the Ukrainians to weaken their main field army, then fighting in the Donbas region, to bolster the defenses of distant cities.”
“[T]heir counterparts in the south took permanent possession of comparable cities.”
“Russian operations in the north and south of Ukraine made very little use of field artillery. … In the east, however, the Russians conducted bombardments that, in terms of both duration and intensity, rivaled those of the great artillery contests of the world wars.”
“The Russian program of guided missile strikes, conducted in parallel to the three ground campaigns, created a number of moral effects favorable to the Russian war effort.”
“The three ground campaigns conducted by the Russians in Ukraine … owed much to traditional models. At the same time, the program of missile strikes exploited a capability that was nothing short of revolutionary. … [T]he Russians rarely forgot that, in addition to being a physical struggle, war is both a mental contest and a moral argument.”
“The Russian invasion of Ukraine may mark the start of a new cold war … If that is the case, then we will face an adversary who, while drawing much of value from the Soviet military tradition, has been liberated from both the brutality inherent in the legacy of Lenin and the blinders imposed by Marxism. What would be even worse, we may find ourselves fighting disciples of John R. Boyd.”
“Ukraine digs in for a long winter campaign,” Lawrence Freedman, FT, 09.02.22.
“Talk of liberating Kherson as the coming stage of the war began in late May, and President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly gave the order to retake the south in July, after which there were a few limited pushes against Russian positions. Indeed, one reason the recent operations might have caught the Russians by surprise is that they were anticipated for so long there was speculation Kyiv had lost its nerve.”
“In practice, however, the campaign had already begun. Since late June, the Ukrainians have been taking out ammunition dumps, command posts and air defenses. More recently they have been cutting off lines of retreat and supply, by attacking bridges over the Dnipro river, notably the Antonivka, the crossing closest to Kherson. Attacks behind the lines have also stepped up—including on Ukrainians collaborating with the Russians—and some spectacular hits on military facilities in Crimea.”
“This campaign is not simply directed at retaking territory but at Russia’s will to continue with a futile and costly war. If it works, it will do so by convincing Moscow that its position is untenable.”
Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:
“After the start of the war, experts said that the sanctions would bring down the Russian economy. But this did not happen. Why? We posed this question to the economists we trust ourselves,” Meduza, 09.05.22. Clues from Russian Views
Ruben Enikolopov, ex-rector and visiting professor at the Russian School of Economics: “The effect of sanctions is [similar to] how a frog is warmed up: it may seem that everything is fine, but the process is lengthy. When change [occurs] slowly, people do not react as [sharply] to it, although on a longer planning horizon we will see that the changes are monstrous—and how the Russian economy is hopelessly behind the leading countries.”
Alexander Isakov, economist at Bloomberg Economics for Russia and Central and Eastern Europe: “The effect of the sanctions turned out to be about the same as in the first big wave of restrictions - in 2014-2015. And the same as in cases of financial sanctions in other countries like South Africa or Iran. They slow down structural growth, but in principle, for a state that has a healthy balance sheet, low debt and a positive current account, they do not have a sudden effect.”
Evgeny Nadorshin, chief economist of consulting company PF Capital, former adviser to the Russian Minister of Economic Development: “Sanctions that relate to oil and oil products may only make themselves felt at the turn of 2022-2023. [Therefore] I do not share the optimistic comments of the authorities that the peak of the decline in consumption has passed, and in general the decline [of GDP] this year will be 3%. My feeling is that 2023 will not be a year of growth in any scenario.”
Oleg Itskhoki, professor of economics at UCLA: “Even if Europe refuses to buy Russian oil and gas, Russia will sell it to India, China and Indonesia. Probably, this will happen with losses in supply volumes, but in many respects, substitution will occur. … According to experts, one day of the war cost $500 million, which is about the same amount that Russia received from energy exports to Europe during this period [per day]. In fact, it turns out that Europe covered Russia's expenses for the war. This will obviously not happen again: these revenues are declining and it will simply be impossible to finance a war on the same scale.”
“Is Russia’s Economy on the Brink?,” Chris Miller of the Fletcher School, FA, 09.02.22.
“Russia’s economic overperformance must be placed in context … Few observers and policymakers expected sanctions to cause enough pain to force Russia out of the conflict in a matter of months, so Russia’s ongoing war shouldn’t be a surprise.”
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“Russia’s economy is still hurting; it is suffering a steeper growth slowdown than was seen during the 2008 financial crisis and one that is unlikely to be followed by a postcrisis rebound.”
“Living standards are being supported by social spending that will be difficult to sustain and that will likely force tough decisions about the government budget over the coming year. ... As time passes, however, the cost of the war and the effects of sanctions on ordinary Russians will only grow.”
“For a health check on the Russian economy, start with some macroeconomic data.”
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“Russia’s GDP has shrunk by around five percent compared with last year, with the rate of decline increasing each month since the war began.
“Industrial production, which includes Russia’s oil and gas industries, has fallen by only about two percent compared with last year … although the manufacturing segment of Russian industry has fallen by 4.5 percent.”
“Inflation stands at just over 15 percent.”
“Adjusted for inflation, monthly wages are down by about six percent compared with last year.”
“Unlike Russia’s energy industry, the rest of Russia’s industrial sector has been hit hard. Among the worst affected sectors have been cars, trucks, locomotives and fiber optic cables, each of which has seen production fall by over half.”
“Russia’s budget is veering toward a substantial deficit if current trends continue. … In some sense, the Kremlin is correct in insisting that Russia’s economy has stabilized. ... Nevertheless, the costs of the war and sanctions are adding up, even if the initial impact was less dramatic.”
“Barring an upswing in oil prices, Russia’s government will face tougher tradeoffs between continuing social spending and tolerating budget deficits and high inflation. Russia’s economy is not going to collapse in a way that forces a halt to the Kremlin’s war effort. The country does, however, face a sharp recession, a long grind of lower living standards and little hope for a quick rebound.”
Ukraine-related negotiations:
No significant developments.
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
“NATO has wisely avoided direct involvement in the fighting in order to avert war with Russia. But the alliance’s unwillingness to militarily defend Ukraine has exposed a troubling disconnect between the organization’s stated goal of making the country a member and its judgment that protecting Ukraine is not worth the cost. In effect, the United States and its allies, even as they impose severe sanctions on Russia and send arms to Ukraine, have revealed that they do not deem the defense of the country to be a vital interest. But if that is the case, then why have NATO members wanted to extend to Ukraine a security guarantee that would obligate them to go to war in its defense?”
“NATO should extend security guarantees to countries that are of intrinsic strategic importance to the United States and its allies—it should not make countries strategically important by extending them such guarantees. In a world that is rapidly reverting to the logic of power politics … NATO cannot afford to be profligate in handing out such guarantees. Strategic prudence requires distinguishing critical interests from lesser ones, and conducting statecraft accordingly. Strategic prudence also requires that the West prepare for the return of sustained militarized rivalry with Russia.”
“The return of a two-bloc world that plays by the rules of realpolitik means that the West will need to dial back its efforts to expand the liberal order, instead returning to a strategy of patient containment aimed at preserving geopolitical stability and avoiding great power war.”
“Both sides of the Atlantic have hard work to do if they are to get their own houses in order and reinvigorate the globe’s anchor of liberal order. … It would be ironic if the West succeeds in turning Putin’s gamble in Ukraine into a resounding defeat, only to see liberal democracies then succumb to the enemy within.”
“Two Cold Wars in a New Bipolar World,” Columbia University’s Robert Legvold, NI, 09.04.22.
“[W]hat if the dominant feature of international politics in the decades ahead turns out to be two interlocking cold wars in a new bipolar world? One is already in place. The United States and Russia have been in a new cold war since the eruption of the Ukrainian crisis eight years ago.”
“Vladimir Putin’s tragic roll of the dice, however, has pushed the new U.S.-Russian cold war to a qualitatively deeper level. … The war in Ukraine also diminished the differences between the old and new cold wars. As the crisis deepened, Putin’s loose but menacing talk about Russia’s nuclear options has revived fears from an earlier era. And as the repression within Russia mounts and Putin and his closest advisors drum with growing passion on, as they claim, the alien, desiccated values guiding the United States and other Western societies, the cultural chasm separating East from West parallels the ideological animosity of the Cold War. The only remaining distinction between the two cold wars is that of scope.”
“A U.S.-China cold war, as during the original Cold War, would engulf and reshape the entire international system—its institutions, alliance structures, economic flows, and zones of conflict. The two countries are not yet at this point of confrontation. Their intensifying rivalry does not, for now, share the characteristics of either the original or the new U.S.-Russia cold wars; but, unless trends are consciously redirected, that is where they are headed.”
“The rudiments of a U.S.-China cold war are thus in place. Crossing the threshold into a formal cold war will occur if the following three trends deepen and then merge. First, if the tension surrounding the U.S.-China military rivalry grows, further distorting increasingly tense economic relations. Second, if the overall strategy of the other country comes to be seen by one or both countries as seriously intent on undoing its domestic order. And third, if the geostrategic competition is seen by one side as tilting decisively in the other’s favor. If the essence of a cold war is a relationship with all the elements of war short of guns firing, but with the risk that they could, that is where the United States and China will then be. That is where the United States and Russia are.”
“How U.S. Grand Strategy Is Changed by Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, 09.02.22.
Angela Stent of the Brookings Institution: “Russia and China have both called for a new post-Western order in which the United States can no longer set the agenda. Beijing seeks a global order where China can set the rules with the United States, but where there will still be rules. Russia, judging by its actions in Ukraine and its nightly television propaganda barrages, is promoting something else entirely: world disorder with no rules. The United States’ grand strategic challenge is to ensure that a post-post-Cold War world will indeed maintain rules—including, most importantly, those designed to avoid large-scale armed conflict.”
Stephen M. Walt of Harvard Univesity: “If preventing the emergence of a rival hegemon in a vital strategic region remains a cardinal principle of U.S. grand strategy, then pivoting to Asia is essential, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. ... The impending European recession will only exacerbate these tendencies … If this trend is not reversed, Washington will find itself doing more than is needed in Europe but not enough in Asia. For U.S. grand strategy, that would be a fundamental error.”
Liana Fix of the Körber Foundation: “The United States should look beyond NATO when assessing Europe’s strategic importance. Until Europeans can assume more responsibility for their own security … the economic realm is where they can be very powerful. Washington will need partners in the looming conflicts of the future, where China will be an economic as much as a security challenge. ... Of course, China is in a whole other economic league from Russia, and Europeans will need convincing reasons to put their economic ties to China in jeopardy.”
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary general and a former Danish prime minister: “The United States and its allies need to provide Ukraine with all it needs to defend its independence for the long term. If the West fails to do this, … Putin will not stop in Ukraine.”
“We propose a simple, four-part framework to guide relations among major powers. This framework presupposes only minimal agreement on core principles—at least at first—and acknowledges that there will be enduring disagreements about how many issues should be addressed. Rather than imposing a detailed set of prescriptive rules … this framework would function as a ‘meta-regime:’ a device for guiding a process through which rival states or even adversaries could seek agreement or accommodation on a host of issues. When they do not agree, as will often be the case, adopting the framework can still enhance communication among them, clarify why they disagree and offer them incentives to avoid inflicting harm on others, even as they seek to protect their own interests.”
“This four-part approach does not assume that rival powers trust one another at the outset or even agree on which actions or issues belong in which category, but over time, successfully addressing disagreements within this framework would do much to increase trust and reduce the possibility of conflict.”
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“The first category—prohibited actions—would draw on norms that are already widely accepted by the United States, China and other major powers. At a minimum, these might include commitments embodied in the U.N. Charter (such as the ban on acquiring territory by conquest), violations of diplomatic immunity, the use of torture or armed attacks on another country’s ships or aircraft.”
“The second category includes actions in which states stand to benefit by altering their own behavior in exchange for similar concessions by others. Obvious examples include bilateral trade accords and arms control agreements.”
“When two states cannot reach a mutually beneficial bargain, the framework offers a third category, in which either side is free to take independent actions to advance specific national goals, consistent with the principle of sovereignty but subject to any previously agreed-on prohibitions.”
“The fourth and final category concerns issues in which effective action requires the involvement of multiple states. Climate change and COVID-19 are obvious examples.”
“Relations with both Russia and China will remain complex, as they will not be one-dimensional even if they are largely competitive or adversarial. High-level, private strategic dialogues should become a component of both bilateral relationships. … Diverging and competing U.S., Russian, and Chinese attitudes and ambitions may rule out more than limited collaboration on world order, but these fault lines arguably make communication among the three countries all the more vital to reduce the chance of a grave miscalculation on geopolitical matters.”
“Meanwhile, U.S. policy should not seek to transform Russia or China, not because doing so would be undesirable but because advocating for regime change would likely prove irrelevant or counter-productive. The United States must deal with Russia and China as they are, not as Washington would prefer them to be. The principal focus of U.S. foreign policy toward Russia and China should not be to reshape their societies but to influence their foreign policy choices.”
“Another reason for prioritizing the promotion of order over the promotion of democracy [is] one that has nothing to do directly with Russia and China. Efforts to build international order, be it for the purpose of resisting aggression and proliferation or combating climate change and infectious disease, have broad support among nondemocracies.”
“A similarly clear-eyed view should determine how Washington approaches cooperation on global challenges. Multilateralism is far preferable to unilateralism, but narrow multilateralism is far more promising than universal or broad forms of collective action that rarely succeed; witness, for example, the course of climate-change diplomacy and trade.”
“The biggest risk to U.S. security in the decade to come is to be found in the United States itself. A country divided against itself cannot stand; nor can it be effective in the world, as a fractious United States will not be viewed as a reliable or predictable partner or leader.”
“Realists have been at the forefront in criticizing the United States’ disastrous foreign policy in recent decades, highlighting the folly of trying to remake the world in its image. As a result, public and even elite views have begun to swing in a more pragmatic and realist direction over the last decade. In failing to adequately explain and respond to the war in Ukraine, however, realists may face a potential backlash to that shift.”
“Realists are probably correct that NATO’s expansion into the post-Soviet space contributed to the war, but that is at best a partial explanation. Other factors appear to have also loomed large in Russia’s prewar decision-making: the prospect of NATO armaments or bases in Ukraine (with or without its formal membership), Western training for the Ukrainian military, Kyiv’s corruption crackdown on oligarchs close to Putin, and Ukraine’s increasing economic ties to the EU.”
“Russia, an aging tyranny, seeks to destroy Ukraine, a defiant democracy. A Ukrainian victory would confirm the principle of self-rule, allow the integration of Europe to proceed, and empower people of goodwill to return reinvigorated to other global challenges.”
“A Russian victory, by contrast, would extend genocidal policies in Ukraine, subordinate Europeans, and render any vision of a geopolitical European Union obsolete. Should Russia continue its illegal blockade of the Black Sea, it could starve Africans and Asians, who depend on Ukrainian grain, precipitating a durable international crisis that will make it all but impossible to deal with common threats such as climate change.”
“A Russian victory would strengthen fascists and other tyrants, as well as nihilists who see politics as nothing more than a spectacle designed by oligarchs to distract ordinary citizens from the destruction of the world. This war, in other words, is about establishing principles for the twenty-first century. It is about policies of mass death and about the meaning of life in politics. It is about the possibility of a democratic future.”
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
“The next iteration of Russia’s quadrennial Vostok exercise has just begun in its far east region, involving more than 50,000 troops, 140 aircraft and 60 warships.”
“The true significance of Vostok 2022 is not size, but its participants. This year, the list of countries from outside the former Soviet Union joining as participants or observers is much longer and, apart from Mongolia, also includes Algeria, Syria, Laos, Nicaragua and India. … Of these, China is clearly the most significant.”
“Since 2018, Vostok has not simulated an invasion by China, which was at least partly a focus of its previous versions. There is no evidence, at least yet, that Moscow and Beijing have moved to the stage of joint operational planning for wartime contingencies. Still, in many ways, China and Russia can be said to be informal allies, a development brought on in substantial measure by the simultaneous containment strategies of Washington toward both.”
“More than six months into a brutal war, the United States and its European allies have made almost no headway in adding to their coalition ranged against Russia. Except for Japan, and to an extent Singapore, the major Asian and Eurasian states are not only not in, but some of them seem to be building even deeper ties with Russia. Washington may wish to reflect as to why its Russia strategy is failing to excite most Asians.”
“Russia’s Turn to the East: Between Choice and Necessity,” Timofei Bordachev of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Valdai Club, 09.01.22. Clues from Russian Views
“The conflict, which is in fact a hybrid war, between Russia and the U.S. and Europe, can be seen as a condition that will make the ‘turn to the East’ no longer an option, but a necessity, and thus force the Russian state to take it seriously. ... [O]ne can make several assumptions that are directly related to what place relations with Asia will occupy for Russia in the coming years.”
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“First, relations with China and, especially, other Asian states are still no way to resolve problems of an existential nature.”
“Second, Russia will have to solve the key tasks of national development on its own, without relying on external sources of technology, not to mention finances.”
“Third, it must be taken into account that even the most active ties in Asia cannot supplant relations with the states of the Islamic world, neighboring countries and, in fact, Europe, where not everyone is inclined to build walls on their eastern border.”
“Relations with the Asian countries are indeed becoming not a choice, but a necessity. However, this does not mean the choice to pursue complete change in the most important guidelines affecting the national foreign and economic policy. Rather, it has an important tactical significance and, with due diligence on our part, can lead in the future to a more adequate Russian presence in world affairs, the center of which is increasingly shifting to Asia.”
“How hard Russia is hit with the West’s punitive economic tools will influence how China moves forward. Already, one Chinese think tank, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, is declaring that Putin is not only beating sanctions, but he is also massively profiting from his war in the face of sanctions due to the spike in oil prices.”
“Accordingly, the United States and the West more broadly must move beyond the current half-measure sanctions on Russia. That means full sanctions on Russia’s Central Bank and the full removal of all Russian transactions from the SWIFT international payment messaging system. It is time to defund Putin’s war machine and send a strong message to Xi: The West can and will decouple its economies from dictatorships when they invade their neighbors.”
Missile defense:
No significant developments.
Nuclear arms:
“Washington should move away from the Cold War–era thinking that focused on preemptive postures and counterforce weapons designed for a massive strategic exchange. The United States should accept that it will probably never use nuclear weapons preemptively—or even at all—except in the unlikely event that the U.S. homeland is subject to a nuclear attack.”
“Washington’s goals of extending deterrence and limiting nuclear proliferation could be better achieved if the United States and its allies enhanced military capabilities that are usable and effective during a conflict. Moreover, in the coming years, emerging technologies and a broad balance of conventional military power will have a far more significant impact on deterrence and defense outcomes than will nuclear weapons.”
“The United States could also reconsider its policies on allies acquiring nuclear weapons. Washington retains its desire to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and should work hard to prevent proliferation. Almost 80 years after World War II, however, nuclear acquisition by democratic allies such as Germany or Japan would be far less threatening than during the Cold War, when it could have torn apart the Western alliance or provoked a Soviet attack. A future world with, for example, a nuclear Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey or Vietnam would hardly be ideal for the United States. It would, however, be far worse for China and Russia.”
“The most important change Washington must make, however, is to its mindset. Cold War thinking about nuclear strategy has long outlasted the conflict itself. More than three decades into the post–Cold War era, policymakers have still not managed to fully update their view of the nuclear threats the United States faces and the proper way to deal with them. For the sake of U.S. national security and for the stability of the world, they need to pick up the pace.”
Counterterrorism:
No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
No significant developments.
Cyber security:
No significant developments.
Energy exports from CIS:
“As the global energy crisis continues to hurt households, businesses and entire economies worldwide, it’s important to separate fact from fiction. There are three narratives in particular that I hear about the current situation that I think are wrong—in some cases dangerously so.”
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“[I]ts short-term revenue gain is more than offset by the loss of both trust and markets that it faces for many years to come. Moscow is doing itself long-term harm by alienating the EU, its biggest customer by far and a strategic partner. Russia’s place in the international energy system is changing fundamentally, and not to its advantage.”
“This narrative also ignores the significant medium-term impacts of the tougher international sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sector. This particularly concerns its ability to produce oil and transport gas.”
“A growing share of Russian oil production had been set to come from more complex oilfields, including offshore, Arctic or otherwise hard-to-recover resources. The absence of western companies, technologies and service providers as a result of sanctions presents substantial risks for the country’s capacity to exploit those resources.”
“Russia was banking on liquefied natural gas as the main way to diversify its exports away from a heavy reliance on Europe. ... Russia’s LNG expansion plans are now back on the drawing board.”
“The first is that Moscow is winning the energy battle.”
“The second fallacy is that today’s global energy crisis is a clean energy crisis. ... When people misleadingly blame clean energy and climate policies for today’s energy crisis they are, intentionally or not, moving the spotlight away from the real culprits—the gas supply crunch and Russia.”
“The third mistaken idea is that today’s energy crisis is a huge setback that will hinder us from tackling climate change. I don’t see it that way. This crisis is a stark reminder of the unsustainability of the current energy system, which is dominated by fossil fuels. We have the chance to make this a historic turning point towards a cleaner, more affordable and more secure energy system.”
“A potential new snag for Putin: The retreat of Jack Frost,” WP’s David Von Drehle, WP, 09.02.22.
“Winter has been Russia's great strategic asset in previous wars, literally freezing the ambitions of Napoleon and Hitler in their tracks on the long road to Moscow. The season has become Putin's last hope for salvaging an outcome in Ukraine that he might call victory. If voters in Germany, Italy and other Western countries get cold enough without the Russian gas they rely on for their heaters, they could force their governments to back away from NATO's unified support for Zelensky.”
“But even Jack Frost might turn his back on Putin. New long-range forecasts strongly suggest that Europe is headed toward a generally mild fall and early winter. La Nina, a change in atmospheric patterns associated with the cooling of surface temperatures in parts of the Pacific Ocean, will most likely deliver warmer-than-normal temperatures to most of the continent. This would reduce the strain on natural gas supplies—though it certainly won't end the need for sacrifice and resolve.”
Climate change:
No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Of the many falsehoods that the Kremlin has spread since the war in Ukraine began more than six months ago, some of the most outlandish and yet enduring have been those accusing the United States of operating clandestine biological research programs to wreak havoc around the globe.”
“In Geneva this week, Russia has commanded an international forum to air its unsupported assertions again. The Biological Weapons Convention … gives member nations the authority to request a formal hearing of violations, and Russia has invoked the first one in a quarter-century. … Even when unsupported by fact, the accusations have played into pre-existing attitudes toward American dominance in foreign affairs. The consequence has been to sow division and doubt—not necessarily to build support for Russia’s invasion, but to deflect some of the blame to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”
“Even before the war in Ukraine, Russia raised alarms about U.S. efforts to establish closer defense and research ties with several of Russia’s neighbors, including other former republics of the Soviet Union. The United States has poured millions of dollars of assistance into those countries, under the Biological Threat Reduction Program. The initiative was originally intended to dismantle the remnants of Soviet-era nuclear, chemical and biological weapons after the Cold War, including in Ukraine. It has expanded to focus on supporting biological research laboratories that are crucial to monitor and prevent diseases from spreading.”
“Although Russian officials repeatedly promised to provide proof of the secret weapons research in Ukraine, they have not yet done so.”
Obituaries and commentaries dedicated to Mikhail Gorbachev:
“Gorbachev’s Disputed Legacy,” Vladislav M. Zubok, FP, 08.30.22.
“Putin, Gorbachev and two visions of Russian greatness,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 09.05.22.
“Wonking Out: The Nightmare After Gorbachev,” Paul Krugman, NYT, 09.02.22.
“Mikhail Gorbachev, a too-trusting statesman,” Stephen Kinzer, BG, 08.31.22.
“Gorbachev didn't set out to open the door to democracy,” Daniel Treisman, WP, 09.02.22.
“Gorbachev’s Revolution,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Endowment, 08.31.22. Clues from Russian Views
“In Memory of Mikhail Gorbachev,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, 08.31.22. (in Russian) Clues from Russian Views
“I want to forestall history, to say that, in general, Gorbachev is a good guy,” Kommersant, 08.31.22. (in Russian) Clues from Russian Views
“Ruler who did not want to kill,” interview with Gleb Pavlovsky, Forbes, 09.03.22. (in Russian) Clues from Russian Views
“Gorbachev and Putin,” Peter Rutland, Jordan Center, 09.02.22.
“Gorbachev lost his country but changed the world,” Editorial Board, WP, 08.30.22.
“Gorbachev’s legacy lives on despite Putin’s repression,” Editorial Board, FT, 08.31.22.
“My memories of Gorbachev in the 1980s,” Tony Barber, FT, 09.02.22.
“Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief,” James Nixey, Chatham House, 09.03.22.
“Gorbachev Freed the Soviet Union but Could Not Save It,” Serge Schmemann, NYT, 08.31.22.
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Muscovites spent the first months after the conflict started anxious and uncertain. Tens of thousands of them fled. But over the summer, the capital largely returned to normal, buoyed by a soaring ruble, a silenced opposition and a news media almost completely under the Kremlin’s control.”
“Still, society is changing slowly: While Mr. Putin has sought to infuse a sense of normalcy, he is also working to further militarize Russian society. Along Moscow’s artery roads there are billboards of soldiers listing their rank and title, with a QR code to scan for more information. And there is no shortage of events celebrating Russia’s military might.”
Defense and aerospace:
See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
“Although leaders in the West are puzzled ..., there are clear reasons for African countries’ reluctance to embrace the Western narrative about Ukraine.”
“For one thing, Africa is a huge, complicated and highly diverse continent, and its 54 countries and territories each have unique circumstances and histories, as well as different relations to both Russia and the West.”
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“Moreover, the skepticism in African capitals about taking the Western side in a faraway war in Europe is also rooted in a power imbalance between the West and African countries that routinely plays out as structural violence.”
“Of course one explanation for African reluctance to fall into line with the West on Ukraine is Russia’s own activities in Africa. … Moscow has been engaged in a large-scale disinformation campaign, particularly online, to shape African opinion about the conflict.”
“The wars of decolonization in Africa are not ancient history. As recently as 2018, a group of living victims of the British colonial government in Kenya successfully sued the British government for the torture they endured in internment camps during Kenya’s independence war in the 1950s.”
“A second reason African countries have been slow to support Ukraine stems from differences between the way African countries and their Western counterparts view contemporary geopolitics. Many of the governments currently pivoting to Russia—including Mali, Ethiopia, and Uganda —owe their political survival to Russian support.”
“History reminds African countries to approach the conflict in Ukraine with caution and to treat claims of friendship with suspicion. For many Africans, the current overtures from both Russia and the West are not about friendship. They are about using Africa as a means to an end. … But the dominant African position, given the large uncertainties about the war and its outcome, has been to demand peace and urge diplomacy—and, whenever possible, to avoid having to take sides in a conflict that seems unlikely to offer much to Africa, particularly if it turns the continent into a new theater of proxy war.” Until earlier this year, Russian diplomats had been reportedly planning to have the second Russia-Africa summit take place in St. Petersburg in November 2022. On July 21, however, the Kremlin made it known that the summit will not take place until 2023. The delay may represent a setback in the Kremlin’s campaign to demonstrate to the world that the West’s claims of Russia’s isolation are untenable.1
“Russia has made worrying inroads into Africa,” Editorial Board, FT, 09.04.22.
“[O]ver the past decade, and at an accelerating pace, Moscow has built a formidable presence in many of the continent’s 54 countries. Its influence is overwhelmingly malign.”
“If CAR is a captured state, Mali is heading that way too. In August 2020, when generals overthrew an ineffective civilian administration, demonstrators appeared waving Russian flags and portraits of Vladimir Putin. ... This picture, with variations, is repeated in countries such as Libya and Sudan. Even nominal western allies find a useful counterweight in Moscow. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, the president who has held power for 36 years, has cozied up to Russia. During a recent visit by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, Museveni cooed that Russia had been ‘with us for the last 100 years.’”
“The West must up its game. It must desperately pay more attention to a continent that by 2050 will be home to one in four of humankind. If it does not, Russia and others will not be so reticent.”
“War in Ukraine has shaken the EU’s power dynamics,” FT’s Sylvie Kauffmann, FT, 08.30.22.
“As a result of the Russian invasion, power dynamics in the EU are changing. Member states formerly occupied by the Soviet Union, and geographically closer to Ukraine and Russia, are not only taken more seriously today—they are also wielding more clout because their mistrust has been vindicated by Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked war, and because their position as front-line states makes them strategically more important. This shifting of the center of gravity is challenging the once almighty Franco-German tandem.”
“This trend has been obvious in the current debate over a visa ban for Russian citizens in the Schengen area. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky called for it; Poland, Finland, the three Baltic states and the Czech Republic have actively supported it. Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s prime minister and an increasingly influential voice in the EU, made the strongest push.”
“Germany openly opposed such a ban, as did Josep Borrell, the EU’s chief diplomat. The Czechs, who hold the rotating presidency of the EU, decided to put it on the agenda of the 27 foreign ministers meeting this week in Prague. The Lithuanian foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, threatened to craft a regional agreement if a deal was not reached among the 27. Eventually, France and Germany had to fight back and work toward a compromise.”
“This is not the old east-west divide, nor old Europe versus new. The war in Ukraine has upset existing coalitions. Viktor Orbán’s proximity to the Kremlin has paralyzed the Visegrad group, comprising Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Poland and the Baltic states can now count on the support of Nordic countries such as Finland and Sweden, putting Paris and Berlin on the defensive.”
Ukraine:
“To understand the views of war-affected Ukrainians, we organized a face-to-face survey of over 1,800 Ukrainians, half of whom were local residents and half of whom were internally displaced people (IDPs). Participants were selected across three towns—Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and Poltava ... in July.”
“We offered respondents three options: ‘yes, we need an immediate cease-fire no matter the territorial cost’ (5.6 percent chose this response); ‘yes, we need a cease-fire but only under the right conditions’ (15.4 percent); and ‘no we should only have a cease-fire when we have liberated all our lands’ (70.5 percent).”
“We [also] asked respondents ‘What do you consider more important? (1) Save the lives of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians or (2) continue the war to free all Ukrainian territories including Crimea and Donbas’—and asked them to indicate whether they felt option (1) or option (2) was very important or slightly important, or if they saw both options as equally important. Is it more important to (1) save lives or (2) free all Ukrainian territories?”
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“Close to 27 percent of our sample of front line Ukrainians believe that it's more important to save the lives of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians rather than continue the war to free all Ukrainian territories including Crimea and Donbas. And 36 percent believe the opposite … Ukrainians overwhelmingly held strong views—both groups saw this topic as ‘very important.’”
“Significantly, across all three cities, Ukrainians forcefully displaced because of the war tended to rank saving lives over territorial liberation more than local residents of these cities.”
“Given straightforward questions with clear patriotic answers, Ukrainians overwhelmingly affirm their belief in victory. But given indirect and trade-off dilemma questions, important differences of emphasis emerge. Ukrainians understandably want to defeat Russia's aggression, to achieve victory and liberate their lands. They are also understandably torn when faced with the real life-or-death dilemmas of this war. Recognizing differences among Ukrainians is important for all those interested in how Ukraine survives this war, successfully negotiates its end and builds a peaceful future beyond it.”
“Invest in the Future of Ukraine,” Volodymyr Zelensky, WSJ, 09.05.22.
“I told the World Economic Forum in May that I plan great leaps ahead for the postwar Ukrainian economy. I committed my administration to creating a favorable environment for investment that would make Ukraine the greatest growth opportunity in Europe since the end of World War II. Today, with the introduction of Advantage Ukraine, I am delivering on that promise. I invite foreign investors and companies with ambition to see the advantage in investing in the future of Ukraine, and to recognize the tremendous growth potential our country presents. We have already identified options for more than $400 billion of potential investment, which reach from public-private partnerships to privatization and private ventures.”
“Ukrainians are grateful for the support we have received from around the world, but today I am writing not to ask for favors. Advantage Ukraine, our new program, outlines investment opportunities that will unleash the economic potential of Ukraine while delivering growth for those who have the vision to invest.”
“Ukrainian journalist Serhii Rudenko’s slim [‘Zelensky: A Biography’] came out in Ukrainian last year, well before this February’s Russian invasion. The author added a few scenes to the recently published English-language edition that depict Zelensky as a wartime leader: in Bucha and in the opening hours of the war. But they add little or nothing to the public record.”
“What Rudenko does provide is a portrait of Zelensky during his first nearly two years in office, when his presidency looked a lot like one more season of his popular television show Servant of the People—slapdash and chaotic. (As an actor, Zelensky played a schoolteacher who, in very unlikely circumstances, becomes president. In real life, he gave his political party the same name as his show.)”
“‘[S]tarting from Feb. 24, 2022, … we have discovered a completely different Zelensky,’ Rudenko writes in the first pages of the book. ‘A man who was not afraid to accept Putin’s challenge and become the leader of popular resistance to Russian aggression. A president who managed to unite in this fight his supporters and opponents, corrupt officials and fighters against corruption, adults and children, people of different nationalities and faiths. A head of state who is greeted with applause in European parliaments and the U.S. Congress.’ But we are still left to wonder how he got there.”
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
No significant developments.
Footnotes
Here and elsewhere italicized text represents contextual commentary by RM staff.
Key Words： Russia,Ukraine,RDCY
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