How China is assessing the US-Iran war

Beyond immediate military dynamics, some Chinese analysts interpret the conflict as part of broader great power competition.

Source: Sunday Guardian

Update: Apr 5th, 2026, 2:18 AM

The US attack on Iran, conducted amid ongoing negotiations, has been widely characterized by Chinese scholars as both a “strategic deception” and a “strategic miscalculation.” Central to this critique is professor Zhang Weiwei, Dean of the China Institute at Fudan University, who argues that the timing of the strike undermined diplomatic credibility while revealing flawed assumptions about Iran’s internal stability. Zhang contends that Washington expected the elimination of Iran’s top leadership to paralyze command structures and incite domestic unrest. Instead, Iran responded swiftly and forcefully, demonstrating institutional resilience.

This outcome has placed the United States in a difficult strategic position: it seeks to avoid both escalation into a prolonged war and the reputational costs of withdrawal. Zhang further emphasizes that such “strategic deception” raises broader concerns for China’s policymakers regarding the reliability of US commitments in future negotiations.

Jin Canrong, professor of international relations at China’s prestigious Renmin University, argues that Israel is the principal driver behind the operation, with the United States acting as a supporting force. He attributes US involvement to the long-standing influence Israel has cultivated within American political structures, a factor particularly visible during the Trump administration. Despite initial tactical successes, Jin notes that the conflict has entered a stalemate after weeks of fighting. He warns that if this continues, domestic pressure within the United States will intensify, driven by rising costs, casualties, and the absence of a clear endgame.

SHRINKING U.S. OBJECTIVES

Niu Xichun, Dean of the China-Arab States Research Institute at Ningxia University, provides a structured analysis of the evolution of US war aims. Initially, Washington pursued regime change or the installation of a pro-US leadership, objectives that now appear unattainable. It then sought to eliminate Iran’s missile and naval capabilities, which has also proven unsuccessful. According to Professor Niu, US objectives have since narrowed to reopening the Strait of Hormuz and exiting the conflict with dignity. Professor Zhang Weiwei adds that dismantling Iran’s “axis of resistance” across the Middle East remains an additional, though equally challenging, objective.

At the diplomatic level, both sides maintain maximalist positions. The United States demands that Iran abandon not only nuclear weapons but all nuclear activities, while also limiting missile capabilities and ending support for proxy forces. Iran, conversely, demands war reparations and guarantees against future US attacks, conditions typically associated with a victorious power. These incompatible demands reinforce the structural logic of stalemate. Professor Jin, however, suggests that when US policymakers eventually seek an exit, Israel could be used as a scapegoat, even though Washington itself has played a central role in shaping the conflict and undermining elements of the post-war and post-Cold War international order.

ATTRITION AND ESCALATION DYNAMICS

Chinese analysts consistently describe the conflict as a war of attrition. The United States continues to apply military pressure, while Iran demonstrates retaliatory capability through missile and drone strikes against Israeli and regional targets. Qin Tian, Deputy Director of the Middle East Studies Institute at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), emphasizes the credibility of Iran’s threat to expand the conflict to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. He underscores its strategic significance as a chokepoint linking the Red Sea to global trade routes via the Suez Canal. Disruption in this corridor would have systemic economic consequences.

Qin also argues that prolonged entanglement in the Middle East contradicts core US strategic priorities, namely, focusing on the Western Hemisphere, managing global trade balances, and competing with China. This misalignment explains why the Trump administration is actively considering negotiation as an exit strategy. He adds that a ceasefire is unlikely unless the United States and Israel, as initiators, take the first step to rebuild trust.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

Domestic political dynamics further constrain US options. Qin Tian observes that Trump’s behaviour follows a recognizable pattern—initial escalation followed by tactical retreat, similar to his approaches on issues such as Greenland and tariffs. Long Chen, Assistant Research Fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University, highlights the electoral pressures shaping decision-making. With all House seats and one-third of the Senate contested in the midterm elections, and Republicans holding only a narrow majority, the political risks are substantial. Losing congressional control would weaken presidential authority and could expose Trump to unprecedented challenges, including the possibility of a third impeachment.

These domestic constraints reduce strategic flexibility and heighten the urgency of achieving a politically viable exit. Professor Niu outlines four potential trajectories for the conflict: negotiated settlement—difficult but feasible, particularly in the form of a temporary ceasefire postponing core disputes; unilateral US withdrawal—possible but complicated by continued involvement of other actors; prolonged stalemate—the most likely outcome, with neither side achieving its objectives and risks of escalation increasing; and escalation—including seizure of strategic assets such as Kharg or other islands or amphibious operations along Iran’s coast, though costly and unlikely to resolve core issues like control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Niu concludes that escalation is strategically unattractive due to its high costs and limited effectiveness. On the question of China providing Iran with hypersonic anti-ship missiles and Beidou satellite services, Zhang Weiwei emphasizes that China will adhere strictly to its Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement with Iran, fulfilling commitments but not exceeding them. He contrasts this with US behaviour, citing continued arms sales to Taiwan despite earlier commitments to reduce them. Zhang also reiterates a broader strategic assertion: that in the event of a direct China-US conflict, the United States would lose its superpower status, reflecting a more assertive strand within Chinese strategic thought.

CHINA’S STRATEGIC ‘RESHUFFLING’

Beyond immediate military dynamics, some Chinese analysts interpret the conflict as part of broader great power competition. An influential and perhaps universal view, reflected by a columnist on Sina.com, frames the war as an opportunity for China to “reshuffle its cards”—not by direct intervention, but by reshaping the structural conditions of global politics.

This “reshuffling” is articulated across three dimensions: Energy and Financial Strategy—China is reducing dependence on the US-dollar-based oil system by promoting renminbi-denominated energy trade with countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is also diversifying energy imports and accelerating the transition to renewable energy. This enhances strategic autonomy while weakening a core pillar of US financial dominance.

Engagement with the Global South—China is strengthening ties with developing regions to counter US-led bloc politics. It has coordinated with Russia at the UN Security Council, advocated ceasefire initiatives, and advanced diplomatic proposals alongside regional actors such as Pakistan. Nonetheless, Liu Zongyi, Director of the South Asia Research Centre at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, notes that Pakistan faces competing pressures from Saudi Arabia on one side and reluctance to align with the US and Israel on the other, leading it to prefer a mediating role to salvage its position.

Technological Self-Reliance—China is accelerating investment in critical technologies, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and new energy systems, in response to US sanctions. This effort is aimed at overcoming structural bottlenecks and building a self-reliant industrial base.

ATTRITION WITHOUT RESOLUTION

Taken together, these institutional Chinese perspectives offer a coherent analytical framework. The conflict is understood as originating in strategic deception, evolving through miscalculation, and settling into a protracted war of attrition. US objectives have contracted, Iran has demonstrated resilience, and escalation remains both possible and undesirable.

At the systemic level, the conflict is embedded in shifting global power dynamics. For the United States, the challenge is to exit without strategic humiliation. For Iran, it is to endure without capitulation. For China, it is to leverage structural change while avoiding direct entanglement. In this sense, the US-Iran conflict is not merely a regional conflict, it is a revealing episode in the reconfiguration of global order.